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ABSTRACT

Nine papers comprise the proceedings from the conference on cultural interdependence between the border regions of San Diego, California, and Tijuana, Mexico. The papers discuss the following: (1) insurgence of the Southwest's Spanish-speaking minority since 1960; (2) opportunities for cooperation between the United States and Mexican governments; (3) increased compatability of people on both sides of the border through education and intercultural understanding; (4) the role of folklore in border relations; (5) United States/Mexican relations in the 1970s; (6) impact of undocumented immigration from Mexico on the United States and Mexican economies; (7) trade and investment programs between the United States and Mexico; (8) urban aspects of the Tijuana/San Diego region; and (9) environmental conservation of the border area. Several general areas of concern are stressed by program speakers and commentators: the Spanish heritage has been historically important and will continue to be significant in the area; the United States/Mexican border region is of an anomalous nature; development of the borderlands must be controlled through policies developed cooperatively by nations on both sides of the border; cultural, scientific, and educational exchanges will probably enhance intercultural understanding; and a solution to the immigration must be found. (Author/DB)

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FRONTERAS 1976

SAN DIEGO/TIJUANA–

THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER IN COMMUNITY RELATIONS: GATEWAY OR BARRIER?

SO 010 391

PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA
NOVEMBER 19–20, 1976

FRONTERAS 1976
Publication Number Three

Co-Directors: Lucy Killea
Mary Walshok

Conference Proceedings
Editor: Kiki Skagen
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INTRODUCTION

"No stronger bond exists between the United States and Mexico than the mix of peoples and cultures to be found in the borderlands. . . . It is difficult for us today to grasp the full significance of this emerging zone of confluence and interchange for nothing quite like it exists elsewhere."

Carey McWilliams, opening speaker at the conference being reported in this publication, stated forthrightly the principal reason for the conference and for a great part of the effort by Fronteras 1976.

The program of November 19 and 20, 1976, was the third in a series of conferences presented by Fronteras 1976 in observance of the bicentennial anniversary of the United States. San Diego launched the Fronteras project within the bicentennial theme of "Horizons '76" to develop greater public comprehension of the interdependence of this border region and to focus attention on the need for structural binational cooperation which transcended the international boundary.

The first Fronteras conference, held at the University of California, San Diego in July 1975, was a three-day preliminary regional planning meeting of some forty academicians and official planners from both sides of the border. The conference identified certain "impact areas" that should receive special attention and become the subject of study and joint planning by specialists on both sides of the border.

The second conference in May 1976 concentrated on hearing from four Mexican officials and specialists how they viewed the border area from their side of the international line. U.S. planners and university border specialists provided comments and questions, while interested citizens from both sides, numbering several hundred, participated through questions and comments. Also, over 2 thousand copies of the proceedings, "A View of the Border from Mexico," have had nationwide distribution.

The third conference in November, 1976, was "SAN DIEGO/TIJUANA, The International Border in Community Relations: Gateway or Barrier?" As its title indicates, this session was designed to highlight border opportunities and problems in which both sides have a vital interest. Special emphasis was given to obtaining wider community understanding and involvement. This public participation was in keeping with the guidelines of a grant to Fronteras and University of California, San Diego Extension provided by the California Council for the Humanities in Public Policy to arrange jointly the conference and published proceedings. The meeting attracted four hundred persons for the opening session and nearly three hundred the following day.

In accordance with funding requirements, the Co-Directors of the conference project were Dr. Mary Walshok, Assistant Dean for Academic Affairs, and

Dr. Lucy Killea, Executive Director of Fronteras 1976. Its success was assured by strong support from staff members of University Extension, from the Fronteras Executive Committee and Fronteras volunteers Col. Edgar Tidwell and Gary Utt. The proceedings were edited by Kiki Skagen Munshi, Program Development Coordinator, and the synopses were translated into Spanish by Sra. Lilia Correa de Pedraza of Tijuana.

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THE BORDERLANDS: 'LET JUSTICE MAKE US FRIENDS'

by Carey McWilliams, LL.B., journalist and author

As a lawyer in the 1930's Mr. McWilliams defended striking Mexican citrus workers. Later, he began an extensive journalistic career with articles and books on, among other subjects, the plight of migrant farm workers in California and Mexican-U.S. border relationships. He served as chief of California's State Division of Immigration and Housing, and for 20 years was editor of THE NATION.

In thinking about the future of the relationships between Mexico and the United States, three interrelated considerations should be kept in mind: the continuing importance of the Spanish heritage; the anomalous nature of the border; and the development of the borderlands.

The Spanish-speaking occupy, of course, a special niche in the roster of American minorities. In the conventional sense they have never been immigrants. In the aftermath of the inglorious Mexican-American war, the United States annexed half of the Territory of Mexico for which it subsequently paid a sum that just might buy an acre or less of prime San Diego real estate at today's prices. In the process we acquired some eighty thousand Spanish-speaking people, most of whom lived in four widely separated clusters of settlement in California, Arizona, Texas and New Mexico. With the more or less simultaneous discovery of gold in California, one might have expected that this isolated minority would be quickly engulfed in the westward movement of population but those initial settlements, lost in time and space, had struck deep roots in an environment that was similar in many respects to that of Spain and Mexico.

To this day the Hispanic imprint remains deep and clear. Spanish is spoken throughout the region. States, rivers, mountains, cities and towns retain names given them by the first colonists. For over a century migrants in uncounted numbers have moved back and forth across the border along well-trodden trails. Wherever they have journeyed, the Spanish-speaking have moved within the cover of a familiar environment, in a region to which they have strong historic ties. In such a setting the word "immigrant" has only a limited meaning.

Keeping in mind the indestructible imprint of the Spanish heritage and taking into consideration present age-levels, comparative birth rates, and the tendency of the Spanish-speaking to remain concentrated in the Southwest, their numbers and their influence will certainly not diminish in the future. By one count, there were 6.2 million Spanish-speaking in the five southwest states in 1970 and an additional 3.1 million outside the area: a more recent count puts the total at 11.2 million. If the number of so-called "illegals" were included, the total would be still larger. But it is next to impossible to determine, at any point in time, just how many Spanish-speaking reside in the region if only because the number of "illegals," many of whom are long-term residents, tends to be grossly exaggerated.

President Polk (1845-1849) and his advisors did not seem to realize—and their successors have hardly been more perceptive—that there are no natural boundaries between the United States and Mexico. The land is all of one piece. As J. Fred Rippy wrote many years ago: "There have been no natural barriers, the two nations being separated by an imaginary line, a barbed wire fence, an easily forded river, and undergrowth of mesquite and chaparral. Citizens of both nations have passed back and forth with little difficulty or interruption or have settled in neighboring states amidst natural surroundings which have not repelled them by their unfamiliar aspect." In an arid or semi-arid region, rivers do not separate peoples: they pull them together. From Brownsville to San Diego twin-cities and towns appear like beads on a necklace. In the area from El Paso to the Gulf, they are often Siamese twins, linked by a bridge. There was once a saloon in the twin towns of Calexico and Mexicali part of which was on the Mexican side of the border, part on this side. A prize location, I should say, for a saloon and its patrons.

As originally drawn the border was a more or less arbitrary line on a map; in many respects it was quite unreal. In the initial isolation that prevailed, the border hardly existed in any formal sense. Restrictions were minimal; the Spanish-speaking moved back and forth with relative ease; the Border Patrol was not established until 1924. In the first fifty years after 1850 patterns of migration were established along familiar historic routes which have persisted to the present time. Initially recruited for employment in mines and in railroad construction and maintenance, the number of Spanish-speaking people gradually increased in areas north of the border.

But with the remarkable expansion of agricultural production in Texas, Arizona and California after 1900--cotton, vegetable crops, citrus—new waves of migrants were drawn north across that imaginary line. During the 1930s the movement abated somewhat but was stepped up during and after the war. Under the Bracero program, an estimated 4.5 million Spanish-speaking found employment in the borderland states between 1942 and 1964. But growers—Texas growers in particular—objected even to the minimum safeguards and standards the program imposed and connived at a wetback influx which soon reached such proportions that large-scale apprehension-and-return raids were carried out. With the phasing out of the program and the adoption of a quota for Mexican immigration, "illegal" immigration increased further.

In retrospect it is clear that for more than a century employers on this side of the border have been able to tap, more or less at will, a large under-utilized pool of labor in Mexico when they have needed it and then to reverse the flow when it has served their interests to do so. And it is at least arguable that some employers have preferred so-called "illegals" because they have lacked status, rights, and organization, and their use has made it possible to minimize social costs in the areas of employment.

However one views this record, two conclusions seem warranted: (1) along no other border or comparable length in the world have such strong push-and-pull factors been operating over such a long period of years. Even making allowance for the unreliability of INS statistics on "illegals," it is mind-boggling to contemplate the magnitude of the migration that has moved back and forth across the border from 1900 to the present time. This migration has shaped and determined the character of the borderlands: the consequences are irreversible.

(2) It has brought into being a borderland zone or regional complex as unique as the border itself.

Strong push-pull factors continue to draw thousands of migrants to the northern tier of Mexican states where, as one observer notes, they have "piled up along the border" seeking whatever jobs are available on either side of the line at whatever rates are offered. The "push" factors behind this movement are potent and persistent. Unemployment rates are high in these states and Mexico is expected to have a population of 126 million by the end of the century. At the same time, the demand for cheap labor in the border states, in part as a result of expanding markets and population in the borderlands, continues to serve as a potent "pull" factor or magnet. Labor intensive plants and factories have been built on both sides of the border: new highways have stimulated trade and tourism. Multinational corporations have hurdled the border with the greatest of ease to establish highly productive "winter gardens" and "vegetable bins" which nowadays supply this country with an estimated 60 percent of its fresh vegetables at certain seasons. As many as three hundred trucks a day are said to enter Nogales during the season carrying more than a billion pounds of vegetables each year which are then trans-shipped to other markets. Annual border crossings suggest the magnitude of the exchange and contacts that now take place: Last year they totaled 157 million through twenty-four ports of entry according to a report by Nicholas Chriss in the Los Angeles Times of August 6, 1976. Nor is this cross-border movement of people all in one direction: Today perhaps one hundred thousand Americans are permanent residents of Mexico and the number is likely to increase with the remarkable developments taking place in Lower California.

As a result of this inter-play of forces a bi-national, bi-cultural, bi-lingual regional complex or entity is emerging in the borderlands. Nothing quite like this zone of interlocking economic, social, and cultural interests can be found along any other border of comparable length in the world. It reflects in a sense the symbiotic relationships that have long existed in the twin-cities and towns. At the same time the growth of the borderlands invests its residents with the power to influence relations between both countries. It is difficult for us today to grasp the full significance of this emerging zone of confluence and interchange for nothing quite like it exists elsewhere but we are beginning to zero in on the emerging realities. Formation last January of an Association of Borderlands Scholars is one sign; the fact that the American Association of Geographers devoted a special session to the Spanish-speaking in its April meeting this year is another. Such conferences as Fronteras has organized may well set a pattern for the other twin-cities. And one can perhaps foresee the appointment of a Bi-national Commission to monitor overall developments and the larger economic aspects not merely of border problems but above all of economic relations between the United States and Mexico.

Unfortunately national attention continues to be focused primarily on the border, not the borderlands: on specific problems, not the larger setting. Much of the current reporting, for example, is of the feature-story variety, concerned with drugs, smuggling, raids, assaults, robberies, apprehensions and the like. Such matters should be reported but within a context that would help explain what is happening and why. Only joint inquiries by both nations, guided and encouraged by local leadership in the borderlands, directed at the underlying issues, is likely to reduce border frictions and tensions.

Looking back over the last several decades it is apparent that a remarkable change in mutual perception between Anglos and Hispanos is occurring in the borderlands. Not so many years ago the late Dr. George Sanchez referred to the Spanish-speaking as "an orphan group, the least known, the least sponsored, and the least vocal large minority in the nation." And as recently as 1966 a spokesman for the minority said: "We're the best kept secret in America." But that day is past. In my personal calendar, I would date the insurgence of the Spanish-speaking from the middle 1960s, with the march of the United Farm Workers from Delano to Sacramento, although of course one can never pin-point the inception of movements of this kind. In any case since 1965 the nation has been made vividly aware of the presence of the Spanish-speaking minority. Today it is visible, audible, and credible. Its political power is increasing: it has registered significant social, cultural, and economic gains. Not enough, by any means, but still significant. But I would also stress that a new Anglo attitude has emerged. A new chapter is being written in the often embittered and tangled relations between the two groups in the borderlands. Neither side will dominate the borderlands: they will share it and that sharing will be reflected in the culture, economy and institutions of the region. Many years ago, in a typical oratorical flourish, senator William Borah said all that ever needed to be said about relations between the United States and Mexico and their respective peoples, when he said: "God has made us neighbors: let justice make us friends."

Cuando pensamos en el futuro de las relaciones de Estados Unidos de Norteamérica y México, se han de tener en cuenta tres factores: (1) la importancia ininterrumpida de la herencia hispana; (2) la naturaleza anómala de la frontera, y (3) el desarrollo del territorio fronterizo.

Los hispano hablantes no siempre fueron inmigrados. Tras la guerra de Estados Unidos contra México, los EE. UU. se anexaron la mitad del territorio de México por el cual, posteriormente, EE. UU. pagó una cantidad con que podría comprarse hoy en día un acre o menos de terreno de lo más selecto en San Diego. En este proceso los EE. UU. adquirieron también 80,000 personas de habla hispana. La influencia hispana permanece profunda y clara, hablándose el español por toda el área anexada. Durante más de cien años los emigrantes han ido y venido a través de la frontera. La palabra "inmigrado" tiene escaso significado en el contexto de esta historia.

Entre los EE. UU. y México no hay límites naturales. Los ríos atraen a las gentes en las regiones áridas, y la frontera, que originalmente se demarcó en forma arbitraria, es irreal en muchos respectos. Es más, la patrulla fronteriza no se había establecido para 1924. Bajo el programa de 'braceros,' alrededor de 4.5 millones de personas de habla hispana obtuvieron empleo en los estados fronterizos (1942-1964). Por espacio de más de un siglo, cuando se ha necesitado, los patrones americanos han sabido sacar provecho del estanque laboral en México, para luego trastrocar esa afluencia conforme les convenga.

En las fronteras está surgiendo un complejo binacional, bicultural y bilingüe. Los residentes tienen poder para influenciar las relaciones entre ambos países, situación que no existe en tal forma en ninguna otra parte del mundo.

POLICIES OF THE U.S. AND MEXICAN GOVERNMENTS: OPPORTUNITIES FOR COOPERATION

by Alan Cranston, Senator from California, Senate of the United States

Mr. Cranston is a member of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs and the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, among others. He served as Controller of the State of California from 1959 to 1967.

Citizens of the United States and of Mexico are Americans who share much common history. Hundreds of thousands of immigrants from Mexico live and work in California and have enriched our culture with their language, arts, music and customs. They have renewed with a new infusion of vitality the Spanish heritage passed on to us by Old Mexico.

Unfortunately, new legislation enacted this year to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act will place new strains on U.S. relations with Mexico. Slated to go into effect on January 1, 1977, it will create new difficulties for many Mexican nationals living and working in California. This law will drastically change the traditional patterns of lawful immigration from Mexico to the United States and as a result Congress and the new administration of President Carter will, I believe, have to consider new policies toward Mexico's nationals who seek to live here permanently or who seek to work here temporarily.

Briefly, the new law establishes for the first time a per country limitation of twenty thousand on immigration in the Western Hemisphere. It also imposes the Preference Category System on immigration in the Western Hemisphere and it completely revises the working definition of who can emigrate to the United States from Mexico and other Western Hemisphere nations.

The impact of the new law on Mexican nationals seeking to enter the United States will be mixed. Those lucky enough to come within one of the favored preference categories probably will be able to emigrate to the United States sooner than they would have under the old law. Other nationals who are already in the United States will be eligible to remain here while their status is adjusted to that of alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. Professionals such as doctors, lawyers, teachers and those skilled in the arts and sciences and who can obtain labor certification from the U.S. Department of Labor may move ahead in the line of those seeking entry into the United States. Generally, people whose services are sought by a U.S. employer will probably do better than they would have under the old law.

On the other hand, skilled and unskilled workers who require labor certification will not have an easy time obtaining certification and unless the potential immigrant can avail himself of an exempted preference category, he will find it difficult to immigrate lawfully into the U.S. In addition, the new law closes opportunities for Mexican parents of infant children born in the U.S.

to obtain immigration visas unless they also obtain labor certification. These changes will effectively deny many Mexican nationals the opportunity to emigrate to the United States for lawful permanent residence.

I think at least three steps should be taken immediately to deal with these new problems: (1) We need new legislation to restore to our contiguous neighbors—Canada and Mexico—their traditional share of western hemisphere immigration visas.

I think that is only fair as our border is a two-way street and it is in the best interest of all our people that we preserve a special status for our next-door-neighbors. In this legislation we should establish a special overall numerical limitation of fifty thousand to be reserved for Mexico and Canada combined.

This higher ceiling will not undo all of the damage of the Immigration Act amendments of 1976 but I think it will help. Under the old law the number of immigration visas granted to Mexicans ranged from forty-two thousand to forty-five thousand annually. Canadian immigration has declined over the years to less than three thousand annually. A joint-pool shared by both nations would permit migration patterns to continue as they have in recent years. Our problem is the unlimited flood of illegal aliens, not reasonably regulated legal immigration and there is no reason to cut Mexico's limitation in half as the new law does.

To avoid penalizing other western hemisphere nations, an increase in the overall hemisphere limitation from 120 thousand to 130 thousand should be effected. (2) Congress and the new administration need to re-examine who, as a practical matter, will be eligible to obtain an immigration visa. Contrary to the claims of the sponsors of the new legislation, the major changes made in immigration law by the new act are controversial in many California communities and elsewhere. The bill was slipped through a badly distracted Senate in the final hours of the Ninety-fourth Congress. In the light of these circumstances, some action, whether legislative or administrative, will be necessary to alleviate undue disruption in the lives and plans of many persons of Mexican origin and descent on both sides of our border. (3) The Immigration and Naturalization Service needs to be overhauled completely by President Jimmy Carter, his advisers and the new Attorney General. The U.S. should establish a rational and consistent plan of attack on the hiring and exploitation of workers who have entered the country without inspection. We should be able to control the hiring of unlawful entrants without the need for new legislation and we certainly don't need new legislation that would threaten the civil liberties of all Americans. A Rodino-type bill, using a national citizen identity card system to control the hiring of illegal aliens, would put unfair pressure on legitimate employers who might find it easier not to hire any Latinos at all rather than risk going to jail. The persistent cry of the INS for such punitive legislation has been a crutch for the absence of any constructive thought by the agency on how to limit the growing presence of illegal aliens in our workforce.

A recent Department of Labor study contains some important recommendations that deserve careful consideration. The study shows that an employer who hires illegal aliens and violates one Tax or Labor Standards Law is likely to violate others. It seems reasonable to ask that these employers should be investigated and prosecuted in the interest, not only of the alien who is victimized, but in the interest of justice for all Americans.

The department has made a proposal that would effect this. It suggests that a federal strike force be established consisting of enforcement officers from each of the following agencies:

Employment Standards Administration to ferret out minimum wage violations;

Occupational Safety and Health Administration to spot OSHA violations;

Internal Revenue Service to check social security and income tax withholdings;

State employment security agencies to look for violations of unemployment insurance tax laws; and

Immigration and Naturalization Service to identify illegals on company payrolls.

The task force would be triggered by discovery of illegal aliens as employees. Its responsibility would be to see to it that all minimum wage, health and safety, tax laws and immigration laws are rigorously enforced. Employers may lose the incentive for hiring illegal aliens if it turns out to be a lightning rod that attracts federal agents to their plants.

Finally, given our own population pressures and the limits of our resources, our overall immigration policy requires better quality attention than it has been getting. Both INS and the Consular Service need to be upgraded and President Carter should name persons of outstanding ability, knowledge and sensitivity to positions in these services.

In the long run, however, we probably never will be able to control Mexican immigration until we decrease the economic disparity between our two nations. Both President Echeverria and President-Elect López Portillo have stressed this point. Population pressures on the Mexican economy have created a high level of unemployment and underemployment. With its population growing at the rate of 3.5 percent a year, Mexico has barely been able to keep pace with the rising demands of its people. The relative unproductivity of Mexico's agricultural land, and higher salary levels in the United States have obviously contributed to the very high rate of Mexican migration into the U.S. President-elect López Portillo has publicly underscored his commitment to strengthening the Mexican economy and to working with the U.S. Government on problems of mutual concern. Among the priorities he says he will pursue are:

Increased industrial and agricultural production;

More effective population programs;

Expanded trade;

Increased access to international capital markets;

More foreign investment;

Better debt conditions;

And less unemployment;

How can the United States help the Mexican people achieve these goals? Increased trade between our two nations is one obvious answer. Already, almost two-thirds of Mexico's foreign trade is with the U.S. Under the present

Generalized System of Preferences—or GSP as it is commonly called—certain items from developing countries are allowed into the U.S. duty free and Mexico could probably export more if we increased the list of items eligible for duty-free treatment.

The Ford Administration had considered adding more products to the list. But nothing has yet been done. I hope the new Carter Administration will and it should be urged to do so, keeping in mind that strengthening the American economy is Jimmy Carter's number one responsibility during his first months in office.

Mexico has an external debt of $15 billion—a large burden on its economy. World wide inflation has made things difficult for all nations—and for debtor nations particularly.

I would like to see the U.S. take a more active role in international lending organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund to ease Mexico's debt burden. Through these multilateral agencies, the U.S. can help Mexico offset its balance of payments deficit, receive development loans on concessional terms, and increase its agricultural and industrial production.

The U.S. and Mexico have developed a pretty good track record for cooperation over the past years:

—Through the joint international boundary and water commission we have solved major problems of flood control, water distribution and border changes.

—We are working together to control the flow of narcotics across our border.

—We are increasing cultural, scientific and educational exchanges.

—And both our governments are about to sign a "Transfer of Sanctions" treaty that would allow nationals convicted in one country to serve their sentences in their home country.

Retiring Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield—a great friend of the people of Mexico—has sagely noted that though U.S. and Mexican approaches to problems are often quite different, our objectives are frequently the same.

"This is as it should be," Senator Mansfield said. "Each nation defines its own self-interest and in that difference lies the opportunity for cooperation."

New Presidents have taken office in Mexico City and in Washington, D.C. This new beginning for both our great nations opens up as perhaps never before the "opportunity for cooperation" that Senator Mansfield talked about.

La legislación del Acta de Inmigración y Nacionalidad entró en vigor el 1º de enero de 1977. Establece un límite por país de 20,000 inmigrantes e impone un sistema de categoría preferente para inmigración al hemisferio occidental, y revisa completamente la definición vigente de quién puede emigrar de México y otros países del hemisferio occidental a EE. UU. Aquéllos cuyos servicios son procurados por los patrones de los EE. UU. probablemente pasarán a la cabeza en la línea de espera bajo esta nueva ley, así como aquellos profesionales que puedan obtener un certificado laboral. A los obreros entrenados y sin entrenamiento que carezcan de dicho certificado les será más difícil, y a menos que los padres de niños nacidos en EE. UU. puedan obtener un certificado laboral no podrán ya obtener visas de inmigración.

Se necesitan tres pasos para sortear estos nuevos problemas. Primero, la nueva legislación debe restablecer las participaciones tradicionales de las visas de inmigración del hemisferio occidental en combinación para México y Canadá. Bajo la antigua ley se concedían anualmente entre 42,000 y 45,000 visas de inmigración a los mexicanos, y ya que la inmigración canadiense ha disminuido a menos de 3,000 anualmente, al compartir la cuota de 50,000 permitiría que los patrones de inmigración siguieran como en el pasado.

Segundo. el Congreso y la nueva administración necesitan examinar nuevamente quién será elegible para obtener una visa de inmigración. Por último, el Servicio de Inmigración y Naturalización necesita ser equipado completamente por la administración del presidente Carter.

Probablemente será imposible controlar la inmigración mexicana en tanto no disminuyamos la disparidad económica entre nuestras dos naciones. La población de México está aumentando anualmente en un 3.5% y México es incapaz de mantenerse a la par con las crecientes demandas de su pueblo. Una respuesta obvia es aumentar el comercio entre México y EE. UU. Al momento, casi does terceras partes del comercio de exportación de México es con EE. UU. Bajo el Sistema Generalizado de Preferencias (GSP) algunos artículos procedentes de países en desarrollo, pasan a los EE. UU. libres de impuesto aduanal, y México podría probablemente exportar más si aumentamos la lista de artículos elegibles a considerarse libres de impuesto. También los EE. UU. podían asumir un papel más activo en las organizaciones internacionales de préstamo y de esta manera auxiliar para aligerar la deuda pública de México, equilibrar su balance de déficit de pagos, recibir préstamos para desarrollo en términos concesionarios e incrementar su producción agricultural e industrial.

Los EE. UU. y México han desarrollado un buen récord de cooperación en el pasado. Quizá nuestros nuevos presidentes nos ayuden a continuar en ese espíritu en el futuro.

DIVERGENT AND MUTUAL INTERESTS OF PEOPLE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER, AND WAYS TO REACH COMPATIBILITY THROUGH EDUCATION AND INTERCULTURAL UNDERSTANDING

by Wigberto Jiménez Moreno, Director, Department of Historical Research, Mexican National Institute of Anthropology and History

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As this is a rather complicated subject we will divide it in two sections: the first will be a statement of facts and an interpretation of them; the second will offer some recommendations.

In the first section we will mention briefly the geographical setting, the anthropological and historical background, the economic and sociocultural processes, the ideologies, the values and attitudes of people on both sides of the border and their styles of life. We will focus on the San Diego-Tijuana situation but we should not forget that each one of these cities functions respectively as a sentinel or an advance-guard of Angloamerican and Mexican societies, cultures and nations.

The minimum geographical context required for our purpose is Southern California and Northern Baja California as far south as parallel thirty-two. The first region goes as far east and northeast as the Colorado River in the vicinity of Yuma and the Chocolate and San Bernardino mountains, and as far north as the San Gabriel, Tehachapi and Sierra Madre mountains, or perhaps even farther up to San Luis Obispo and Morro Bay. The second region reaches as far south as the small settlements of Rosario and San Fernando, just north of the Central Desert.

In Southern California—without the Mojave Desert—there are basically two different environments: the Imperial Valley between Palm Springs and Calexico and, on the other hand, the San Bernardino-Riverside Valley together with the Coastal Slope which contains the evolving Santa Barbara-Los Angeles-San Diego megalopolis. In Northern Baja California we have on one side the Dominican Frontier headed by Tijuana, and, on the other side, the Colorado Desert and Delta, dominated by Mexicali and stretching southward beyond San Felipe, to Bahía de Los Angeles. This region also continues northward into the Imperial Valley. There are certain similarities, as well as differences, between the Coastal Slope of Southern California and the Dominican Frontier of Northern Baja California. The bays of Ensenada and San Quintín resemble the harbours of Los Angeles and San Diego and just as Northern Baja California faces to the south and the Central Desert, Southern California looks northeast to the Mojave Desert. In both cases we cannot ignore the links of all kinds with the two

deserts. Can we forget, for instance, the great interdependence between Los Angeles and Las Vegas, a city within the Mojave Desert? We should remember too that Bahía de Los Angeles at the southern end of the Colorado Desert belongs to the district of Ensenada.

Although such is the minimum geographical context required, we should not forget that throughout history there have been numerous links between the major area that we outlined and the adjoining region of Southern Arizona-Northern Sonora. We can learn a great deal by contrasting this zone with the one we are dealing with. Finally, we should remember that for quite a long time the fastest way to go from Mexico City to San Diego-Tijuana or vice versa was by train through El Paso, since airline and highway connections became available only in contemporary times. The train arrived at Mexicali in 1948 and the road linking that city with the Mexico-Nogales highway was finished a few years later.

Among the earliest inhabitants of both Southern California and Northern Baja California we have the San Dieguito people. They came southward from the Mojave and Colorado deserts and entered the San Diego area as well as the Dominican Frontier of Baja California (where Tijuana is located) about 9000 or 8000 BC and reached Rosario by 7000 BC. Then, from 5,500 to 2000 BC the La Joya I Culture spread southward from just north of San Diego to the same Dominican Frontier as far as Rosario, whence it turned southeastward. Perhaps it went as far as Bahía de Los Angeles by 4000 BC since skulls found in this place bear a striking resemblance to those of La Joya I. Finally, the bearers of Pinto Basin and Gypsum Cave cultures also came southward from the Mojave and Colorado deserts by 5000 BC. and entered Northern and Southern Baja California, where their culture prevailed until about 1000 BC. Between this date, in which the Amargose phase begins, and the arrival of the early Spanish explorers and missionaries of the 16th and 17th centuries, the existing cultures remained basically unchanged except in the vicinity of the Colorado delta where agriculture and pottery were known—thanks to the influence of the Patayan culture—after 500 A.D. A pre-agricultural horizon like the Upper Paleolithic survived in most of Baja California.

At the time of contact with Europeans, according to William Massey, the ethnic groups of Northern Baja California were "California Yumans" and "Borjeño Cochimí," both of the same linguistic family. Most of those of Southern California were either Yumans or—like the Chumash—belonged, together with the Yumans, to the Hokan "phylum". This was a very ancient and marginal linguistic stratum which had been cut in two by the intrusion of a Uto-Aztecan wedge of Shoshonean languages. As far as San Diego-Tijuana are concerned, that area was inhabited by Diegueño Indians, and in the Mexicali and Imperial Valley areas, one group—the Kamia or Kemaya—was also living on both sides of the border.

The coming of explorers and missionaries in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is well known. Everybody has heard about Cabrillo's landing in Punta Loma in 1542 and about the establishment of the San Diego Mission in 1769 by Fr. Junípero Serra. Both the Pacific and the Gulf Coast of Northern Baja California had been touched by the early navigators since 1539-1542 but land exploration (except for Alarcon's expedition up the Colorado River in 1540) came only in 1766 with Linck reaching San Pedro Mártin, and in 1769 when the Franciscans founded the missions of San Fernando and San Diego.

The first one was soon abandoned whereas the latter became the starting point for the building of eight additional missions from there to San Luis Obispo (1772). The last of the Southern California missions was Santa Ines established in 1804. South of the present border, the Dominicans created nine missions between 1774 and 1834. The Indian population was declining during those years on either side of the present boundary and continued to do so until it almost disappeared. In 1826, Governor Echeandía started the secularization of the missions and very soon their land was given to ranches or they were transformed into pueblos. Then came the Mexican War when the present boundary was established by the treaty of Guadalupe of 1848. Until this date, Southern California and Northern Baja California had a common history and were ruled under the same government.

In spite of the victory of "Californios" against Americans in San Pasqual, Southern California became American, but not until a hundred years ago, after the first train came to Los Angeles, did the population of Mexican origin begin to be outnumbered by Anglo-Americans. The great boom of 1886-87 changed the predominant Mexican (rather than Spanish) look of cities. But just when such a heritage was being swept away, people began longing for it, full of nostalgia, as Dr. Carey McWilliams explained in "Southern California: an Island on the Land." (1946.) Helen Hunt Jackson, with her writings on "Ramona" and the Franciscan missions, had started a new attitude among Anglo-Americans. The missions were not only reconstructed but made so beautiful, so full of paintings and sculptures and so many things, that the Franciscans of 150 years ago, in the days of Governor Echeandía, would hardly recognize them. Those buildings were made the symbols of a glorious past because uprooted Americans wanted to have roots in their new land. They adopted the heritage of the "Californios" who, ironically, were just as Mexican as other groups of the same origin that were not equally acceptable to Anglo-American society.

Perhaps for this reason the "Californios" and the Southern California heritage were considered to be Spanish—an ethnic name which acquired prestige thanks to Charles Lummis—while the not-so acceptable people who came later from Sonora in 1849 and from many regions of Mexico were just "Mexicans" or "greasers". This highlighting of "Spanish" things did not suffer much with the war of 1898, perhaps because the victory was so quick and the prize so high. The magnificent complex of buildings in Balboa Park in San Diego, created for the Panamá-California Exposition of 1915-1916, were inspired not only by monuments and gardens of Spain, however, but also by the churches, archways and courtyards of Mexico City, Tasco, Querétaro and Guadalajara, so that perhaps there is an even higher proportion of architectural elements and ornamental motifs taken from Mexico but believed to be Spanish because of the prestige attached to that name. But to make them only Spanish is a way to deny or ignore the Mexican heritage.

The surprising thing is that the new architectural style, developed through the reconstruction and embellishment of the missions, and the construction of the complex of the Panama-California Exposition, derived mainly from Mexico, now began to inspire the building of homes in that country, particularly in Mexico City. Starting in the middle 1920s and lasting for at least two decades or more, this style was known as "California Colonial." The actual Spanish influence in San Diego was increased then, for the California Pacific International Exposition of 1935, the Gardens of the Alcázar in Seville and the Home

of the Moorish King in Ronda were duplicated. The architectural influence of Los Angeles-San Diego was in turn felt in Tijuana when the Agua Caliente resort was built between 1926 and 1928 with its luxurious Gold Room and its Moorish tower, the first important building in that city, of which scarcely more than the tower remains.

Tijuana's urbanization began in 1889 as a result of the growth of San Diego but went so slowly that at the beginning of the twentieth century there existed only a few public buildings and a handful of perishable homes. Then Prohibition in the United States gave Tijuana a chance to develop. Those were the years of the "roaring twenties" when many Americans found it difficult to stick to the austerity of the Puritan tradition and went to Tijuana—where they continue going—in search of unrestrained relaxation. When President Cárdenas closed the Casino of Agua Caliente in 1935, Las Vegas began to take its place although the Mexican city kept some of its old attractions and developed new ones, and now with the sexual revolution many Americans find here what formerly they were seeking south of the border.

The people of Tijuana are tied to San Diego from the economic viewpoint and to a lesser extent San Diego has to count on Tijuana not only as a customer, but also as a provider of certain goods. Therefore in the economic aspect there is no doubt that San Diego and Tijuana have mutual interests. The same could be said about Mexicali and Calexico, except that in this case the Mexican city is the dominant partner. Because Mexicali achieved some economic independence from Southern California and was nearer the Mexican mainland, it became the capital of Northern Baja California in 1915, replacing Ensenada which had held that rank since 1882.

I do not see mutual interests in other activities. Nevertheless, the fact that Roman Catholicism is the predominant religious denomination in Southern California and that the same is true to a greater degree for Northern Baja California, implies that certain beliefs and norms are held on both sides of the border. There is also a large Spanish speaking population in Southern California while in Northern Baja California, especially in Tijuana, a growing number of people speak and read English. In the course of time, this bilingual situation will help intercultural and international understanding. The Spanish spoken in Tijuana has borrowed a number of words from English or has been influenced by it in some way. There is a kind of "pocho" trend south of the border with a lack of clear cultural identity, a condition somewhat similar to what we find among Mexican-Americans.

The Americans of San Diego and the Mexicans of Tijuana live side by side, yet they don't know each other's history and culture. The Mexicans are interested in the technology of the other country, and the Americans enjoy Mexican music, handicrafts and cooking but very seldom is it more than that.

On the other hand Mexicans of Tijuana are almost swallowed up by the magnetic attraction of a great center of polarization—Los Angeles—to which San Diego is attached. At the same time, however, they receive great influence from and depend politically on distant Mexico City. This leads them, perhaps unwillingly, to an almost schizoid attitude.

Baja California exerts a certain fascination on Southern California. The descendants of pioneers who explored and colonizied the West go beyond Tijuana and Ensenada to reestablish communion with Nature and communica-

tion with human beings, and to feel themselves again pioneers. They perhaps do not realize that when they yearn for the pastoral Arcadia before the Mexican War, they are really dreaming about Mexico and the Mexican people, monuments, customs and costumes which, in order to be acceptable, had to be regarded as Spanish from Santa Barbara to San Diego. So, no matter how unconscious of their nostalgia for the Mexican heritage and of the spell of unsophisticated rural Mexico, the Southern Californians might also have a schizoid attitude.

A common feature of the great cities of Southern California and Northern Baja California is the population explosion experienced by Los Angeles and San Diego on one side, and Tijuana and Mexicali on the other. Internal migration crowded those cities but some foreigners, such as Chinese, also came to both regions. This brought continuous change and, at certain times, a great deal of unrest with an amount of lawlessness and crime, all this being common and almost typical in the formative period of the "frontier culture."

I apologize for having taken so much time mentioning facts that are well known in order to emphasize how many things there are in common for Southern California and Northern Baja California, and especially for San Diego and Tijuana. These are really sister cities even if they are step-sisters. They have grown in the same geographical environment and their most ancient inhabitants were the same people on both sides of the border since the days of San Dieguito and La Joya I cultures. At the time of the arrival of Spanish explorers and missionaries the same Diegueño Indians were living on both sides of the present border, and Cabrillo's landing at Punta Loma must have been known at the Indian settlement of "Tijuán" if it already existed at that time. When the San Diego mission was founded, Tijuana Indians were indoctrinated from here. In 1826, secularization of missions started and out of them ranches and villages began to appear on both sides of the present boundary, which was established in 1848, after centuries of common history. By a miracle, Baja California did not become American: the Civil War prevented that. Then, the completion of the first transcontinental railroad in 1869 and the coming of the first through train to San Francisco in 1870 ended the isolation of California, which until that time was like an island. Almost immediately, stage-coaches drove southward even as far as Santo Tomás, then the capital of Northern Baja California. But in Southern California the Mexican way of life prevailed until the arrival of the train to Los Angeles, just a century ago, or up to 1885 when San Diego became tied to the transcontinental railroad, or even until 1887 when the Santa Fe came here. In that year, the peak of the westward migration was reached, and the boom it created furthered the initial urbanization of Tijuana. From its birth, this Mexican outpost was tied to San Diego, as in marriage, for better or for worse. As in the case of so many couples, we can look at the two cities as complementary opponents. They are also standard-bearers of two cultures and sentinels of two nations. The eagles of the American and Mexican coats-of-arms face each other at the border and it is better if they don't quarrel.

In the days of Wilson and Carranza, and again in those of Cárdenas and Roosevelt or López Mateos and Kennedy, grounds for real friendship based on mutual respect and understanding were established between Mexico and the United States. Let us hope that this respect and understanding will grow in the near future under the new leaders of both nations. Let us hope also that, in spite of its problems with ethnic groups, California will develop towards

Mexicans of Baja California the same kind of friendship and collaboration that exists between Arizona and Sonora, with the governors of such states or the mayors of cities on each side of the border participating in conferences of mutual benefit like this one. That is the spirit which will demolish barriers and open gateways. At about the same distance from the border, Tucson is a typical western American city and Magdalena a representative one of Northern Mexico. Each retains its own style of life. Neither does Magdalena want to become American, nor is Tucson afraid of becoming Mexican. Both realize, however, that they sprang from the same ecological and cultural area—the Pimería Alta—that was missionized by Father Kino. Father Kino's bones, incidentally, were found under my leadership by a Mexican-American team of experts—a good example of international cooperation.

Let me add a few recommendations. Americans of Mexican origin will be better citizens if they know about the American and Mexican background of their double heritage. They should be taught in Spanish during the early grades of Primary School and afterwards in English so that they really know both languages. Mexicans of Tijuana, Tecate or Mexicali should be encouraged to learn English and to know it as thoroughly as possible. I don't believe that much is achieved with a knowledge of only basic English or basic Spanish. That is good enough for soldiers, sailors and merchants but not for intercultural understanding. One has to be interested in the other people's culture. Through television programs emphasizing cultural aspects of the other country as well as its history, much could be achieved. Dances and festivals as well as popular songs should be broadcast. Concerts should be given, and paintings, engravings and sculpture displayed, as well as photographs of major architectural achievements. There should be lectures about the other country's history and culture, and the interchange of teachers and students should be promoted. Bookstores selling Mexican books in San Diego and American books in Tijuana should be established, as well as representative stocks of Mexican books in the San Diego Public Library and American books in the Tijuana Public Library.

Museums with the flora and fauna of Southern California and Northern Baja California, like the Sonora-Arizona Museum of Tucson, would be welcomed. A most desirable goal would be to have in San Diego a museum displaying the basic facts of the history of the United States as well as a special section on both Californias, American and Mexican. In the same way, it is very necessary to have in Tijuana a museum devoted to the history of Mexico, as well as to the history of the Californias.

Through such steps, people who live side by side at last would really get to know each other.

La primera sección de este trabajo trata del marco geográfico del área fronteriza de Tijuana y San Diego con algo del trasfondo antropológico e histórico. Traza los patrones migratorios de los primitivos habitantes del área: los San Dieguito. Hasta el tiempo del Tratado de Guadalupe en 1848 tanto California Sur como Baja California Norte habían tenido una historia común y eran gobernadas por el mismo gobierno. Con el primer tren que llegó a Los Ángeles en la gran bonanza de 1886-1887 las ciudades mexicanas principiaron a cambiar. Pero la gente se hizo protectora de la herencia hispana al tiempo en que ésta se empezaba a erradicar. Las misiones fueron reconstruidas y se hicieron símbolos del glorioso pasado. Se consideró que la herencia del sur de California era española en oposición a lo "mexicano" debido al alto prestigio que alcanzaron las cosas "españolas."

La urbanización de Tijuana empezó en 1889 debido al crecimiento de San Diego y posteriormente se desarrolló durante los días de la prohibición. Económicamente Tijuana y San Diego tienen intereses similares. Una característica común a ambas es la explosión demográfica. Ambas han crecido en el mismo ambiente y los antiguos habitantes eran el mismo pueblo en ambos lados. La historia de cada uno, quizá, debiera ser conocimiento común a ambos.

THE ROLE OF FOLKLORE IN BORDER RELATIONS AND HOW IT EXPRESSES INTERCULTURAL CONFLICT AND COOPERATION

by Américo Paredes, Ph.D., Professor of English and Anthropology, University of Texas at Austin

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In these meetings we are concerned with the problems which are typical of areas adjacent to international boundaries but as a folklorist I am interested mainly in other boundaries, the invisible ones that people build between each other. Folklore—we folklorists like to think—provides us ways to reach across boundaries, both the unofficial and the official kind. And it is true that areas of folk culture can defy borders and immigration regulations. The folklore of Sonora and Arizona, or of Chihuahua and New Mexico, are more akin than—say—the folklore of Sonora and Chihuahua on the one hand and that of Oaxaca and Chiapas on the other. Furthermore, though such items of contemporary folklore as legends, jokes, and derogatory labels set up obstacles to the interaction of ethnic groups, under certain conditions they can establish ingroup-outgroup feelings that may reach across ethnic boundaries. The performance of such kinds of folklore will not solve the economic drain on Mexican border areas; it will not clean up polluted rivers or solve the migrant question. Yet, an understanding of the ways folklore functions may show us some of the ways people surmount their differences or make them worse, how they feel and react to their problems.

Folklorists and anthropologists have long been interested in the processes by which we set up boundaries to demarcate groups, ethnic or otherwise. In 1959, folklorist William Hugh Jansen, in an article called "The Esoteric-Exoteric Factor in Folklore," noted how our awareness of people whom we classify as belonging to groups different from ours is determined as much by what we think of them as by what we think that they think about us. The group's image of itself, and its image of other groups, is reflected in the folklore, and it "takes on peculiar properties from the group within which it is found."[1] Furthermore, a group may be aware of the stereotypes regarding it in the folklore of a rival group, and it is possible for the first group "either to reject those concepts or to recognize them tolerantly. Thus it is that American Negro tales collected from Negroes may be based upon obviously white. . .concepts of Negro characteristics, and thus it is that some of the most pernicious anti-Semitism appears in Yiddish jokes told by Yiddish comics."[2]

A decade later we find social anthropologists still addressing themselves to the problems of ethnic groups and their persistence. In *Ethnic Groups and*

Boundaries, Fredrik Barth has collected essays by several Scandinavian anthropologists. In his introduction Barth says that most anthropological thinking is "that cultural variation is discontinuous: that there are aggregates of people who essentially share a common culture, and interconnected differences that distinguish each such discrete culture from others." He sees as simplistic the "view that geographical and social isolation have been the critical factors in sustaining cultural diversity" and maintains that "cultural differences can persist despite inter-ethnic contact and interdependence." To him, the most important feature defining an ethnic group is that it "has a membership which identifies itself, and is identified by others, as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order." Of the fact that ethnic groups share a common culture, he says that "much can be gained by regarding this very important feature as an implication or result, rather than a primary and definitional characteristic of ethnic group organization."[3]

That is to say, ethnic groups most often share a common culture which may vary due to local or ecological factors and which may be modified by outside influences without losing its identity. Those factors which are important in fixing the identity, however, must been from the inside. They are important insofar as the actors involved regard them as significant, the "actors" being the ingroup and the outgroup or groups that ascribe the ingroup its identity. Ascription itself may be a tricky thing, especially in regard to self-ascription by members of a group. The label "Chicano," for example, may be said to depend on self-ascription; a Chicano is a person who calls himself a Chicano. Few outgroup members would be inclined to challenge such a term of self-ascription; though there undoubtedly are differences in the image projected by the term "Chicano" for Chicanos and non-Chicanos (Jansen's concept of the esoteric-exoteric factor) still there will be a core of agreed-upon features to serve as the basis for the identity. Such has not been the case with other self-ascriptive terms that people of Mexican origin have used in the United States. Take "Spanish," for example. A Mexican-American may call himself "Spanish," but that does not guarantee that the Anglos he deals with will cease to consider him a Mexican. Ascription—by oneself or by others—still depends on cultural factors; not exactly what is out there, but what one chooses to see, and what attitudes are taken in regard to what one sees.

In some cases, regional or ecological factors may be less influential in the fixing of ethnic identity than are those cultural features the outgroup chooses to emphasize. One of the things about the Mexican on which Anglos fixed their attention from the earliest days of contact was Mexican food. There is a great variety in Mexican food, depending on regional and historical factors. The regional diet of some Mexicans, for example, was much less greasy than that of rural Anglos of the first half of the nineteenth century. But part of the stereotype of the Mexican in the Anglo mind has been that the Mexican's food is not only hot but greasy. Derogatory names, jokes, and mocking verses have exploited the theme. Yet, Mexican-Americans themselves use Mexican food as a badge of their identity. Recently, the stereotype has been turned around, but by the Anglo rather than the Mexican. At parties Anglos vie to see who can swallow the greatest number of jalapeño peppers; and, in Texas at least, they flock to pseudo-Mexican restaurants to gorge themselves on culinary monstrosities labeled Mexican food.

Since what other people see in us, and what we see in them, is important to the way we draw ethnic boundaries, a glance at the use of derogatory ethnic labels should be instructive. I once took it upon myself to count the number of such names assigned to each national or ethnic group in a dictionary of American slang published on the East Coast a decade or so after World War II.[4] Considering the recent conclusion of that bloody war and its attendant propaganda, one would have expected a wealth of derogatory terms for our former enemies. But there were fewer than ten derogatory terms for "Japanese"; "Italian" mustered only thirteen, while "German" was the winner with twenty-four. There were 43 derogatory terms for "Irishman"; 50 for "Jew"; and 150 for "Negro."

It seems that proximity and visibility are the factors that encourage the coining of derogatory names, and no one is closer and more visible than your ethnically different neighbor. In this respect the U.S.-Mexico border is no different from the borders between one ethnic neighborhood and another in any large American city and a list of derogratory terms composed in the Southwest or the West Coast would show quite different figures, with Mexicans and Orientals in the lead.

There are many sources for derogatory ethnic names, but the main ones have to do with the diet, the speech, the habits and the physical appearance of the ingroup. Anglos have coined many derogatory names for the Mexican based on the Mexican's diet; a few examples are pepper belly, chili choker, taco guzzler, frijole hound, and hot tamale. The Mexican, on the other hand, has made little use of diet as a source for names for the Anglo, *jamonero* (ham eater) and *repollero* (cabbage eater) practically exhausting the list.

The case is reversed when it comes to physical peculiarities. The main derogatory term for the Mexican based on his imputed physical appearance is "greaser." The Mexican's list is long; *patón* (big foot), *cristalino* (crystal eyes), *cara é pan crudo* (dough face), *blancanieves* (snow white), and *ganado Hereford* (Hereford cattle, because of the white face) are a few examples. Speech peculiarities have provided the Anglo with "spic," while the Mexican has come up with *gademe* (goddam) and borrowed *gringo* from earlier Spanish usage. Imputed customs and occupations have led to names like "switch-blader" and "peon" for the Mexican, and *mascatabaco* (tobacco chewer) and *turista* (tourist) for the Anglo.

The short list given here could be expanded considerably for both sides. But even a small sample such as the one we have just considered shows us the outlines of two familiar stereotypes that have been part of the boundaries we have set up between us. Once the stereotype is established, it can be evoked in other ways, especially in ethnic jokes.

Humorous folklore has its functions. It may afford relief to an individual in the form of release from tension and frustration. It may bring a group closer together, affirming its bonds through an attack on the outsider, reaffirming the group's boundaries against the outside world. Whether we can use humor of this sort to reach across boundaries and bring groups together instead of reaffirming their apartness is another matter indeed. As far as name-calling is concerned, the matter is a risky one at best. The functions of teasing and joking behavior are recognized in the anthropological literature, but these are usually

found as performances taking place between individuals within the same ethnic group, and often within the same status or age category. Joking or teasing between individuals of different statuses usually tends to affirm differences rather than to diminish them. Verbal dueling between members of different ethnic groups may be successful if the two adversaries regard each other quite frankly as equals, but even so it occurs on precarious ground because, as Richard Howell says, "the insult tests a bond of uncertain strength."[5]

The performance of jokes is usually considered safer than the artistic insult. William Jansen, in the article previously referred to, notes that Negroes may tell stories based on white stereotypes of their own people, while Jews often tell "Jewish" jokes. Jansen comments on the "toleration" we may have of stereotypes of ourselves held by a rival group. There is no doubt that different groups exhibit different degrees of tolerance to stereotypes about themselves. But even this apparent toleration has its limits. It all depends on who is telling the joke, to whom, and for what purpose.

In an article published a decade ago, I thought I saw a definite progression in Mexican and Mexican-American folklore in regard to its tolerance of Anglo stereotypes about the Mexican, and in the attitudes toward the Anglo expressed in different kinds of Mexican folklore.[6] Open hostility toward the Anglo is most often expressed in the heroic *corridos* and the legends that accompany them. The Anglo is stereotyped, but he is taken seriously, as a dangerous opponent of the Mexican.

Such is not the case with a type of Mexican joke in which the Anglo is characterized as an innocent. To all the faults given him in the *corridos* is added a gullibility that allows the Mexican to take advantage of the Anglo every time they meet. But it is not only the Mexican's stereotype of the Anglo that is exploited in these jokes. Also present is the Anglo's stereotype of the Mexican, except that it is turned against the Anglo and in the Mexican's favor. Often it is because the Anglo in the joke sees the Mexican in terms of sterotypes that the Mexican is able to take advantage of him. In such cases, the Mexican "tolerates" stereotypes about himself, but only to use them as weapons against a rival group.

Closer to the situation described by Jansen is another kind of Mexican joke, in which the Mexican apparently buys the Anglo's stereotype of himself and uses it in self-satirizing jokes. What these jokes "mean" is not readily apparent merely from a reading of their printed texts. Again, it all depends on who tells the joke, to whom, and under what circumstances. In certain performances, they may be vehicles for wisdom and insight into interethnic conflicts. In other situations they may be exercises in masochism or shows of self-abasement before the rival, dominant group.

Other peoples have traveled this same road. I still believe, as I did ten years ago, that through his humor "the Mexican works through a series of attitudes in regard to the inescapable actuality which the Anglo-American represents for him, not only moving toward greater wit and wisdom but attaining a kind of universality as well."[7] Which may all be well and good, as far as understanding ourselves a little better, within the boundaries that delimit our own ethnic groups. But it does not tell us much about what lies beyond the fence.

In "Differential Identity and the Social Base of Folklore," Richard Bauman points out that the performance of folklore does not require the context of

shared identity. What is crucial for artistic verbal communication is a shared esthetic of spoken language and shared knowledge of the rules of communication.[8] But even the most dissimilar individuals must share (however fleetingly) something more than a knowledge of the rules of artistic communication, if a folklore performance is to be successful. We may be fully aware of the artistic rules governing a joke-telling session, for example, and yet fail to applaud or even recognize a performer's virtuosity if the content of his performance offends us. Without prejudice to the crucial role played by shared knowledge of the rules of communication, one may argue that the attitudes that members of different ethnic groups bring to a performance of jokes or a session of playful insult can be a deciding factor in the success of the performance. Perhaps the most one can say about the general functions of interethnic joking behavior has been said by Howell, who states that "teasing behavior" may be an important means of exploring boundaries.[9]

Interethnic folklore performances, then, can explore boundaries, test them, and tell us how far we may go in transcending them. The exploration may have widely differing results, varying from shared laughter to hostility. But those results will depend on other factors. "Familiar behavior," says Howell, "represents an advance into the personal preserve of another; if the other party is willing to share his personal space the advance marks the closeness of the relationship, but if the other party is not willing to share his personal space the advance is an unwelcome intrusion with the implication of threat in some way." He goes on to say that "teasing relationships are based on a potential closeness, even if that closeness has yet to be realized."[10]

Between peoples, as between individuals, whether that potential closeness is realized, or whether it is interpreted as a threat, often depends on the social and economic status of the participants. It is an observable fact that minorities in the United States become more tolerant of joking stereotypes about themselves the higher they rise on the social and economic scale; while minorities still struggling for self-fulfillment are likely to be touchy even about well-intentioned attempts at humor by outsiders.

Humorous border folklore can help us recognize—and even to explore—the boundaries that separate us. But of itself it can do little to transcend those boundaries, unless economic opportunity and social justice work to put both peoples on a more even footing.

Los folkloristas se interesan en las fronteras invisibles que separan a los pueblos y ven el folklor como una manera de alcanzar a los que están del otro lado. Al entender la función del folklor podemos ver como los pueblos se remontan por encima de sus diferencias, o las empeoran.

A menudo los grupos étnicos comparten una cultura común que varía con respecto a los factores locales o ecológicos. La atribución de "identidad" depende los elementos culturales—de lo que uno escoge ver y las actitudes adoptadas hacia lo que se ve. Las etiquetas derogatorias pertienen a la demarcación de fronteras étnicas en base de lo que otros ven en "nosotros" y lo que "nosotros" vemos en "ellos."

La proximidad y visibilidad parecen propiciar el surgimiento de nombres derogatorios, sin que ninguno sea más cercano o más visible que el propio vecino diferente étnicamente. Las principales fuentes de nombres derogatorios son la dieta, el habla, los hábitos y apariencia física del grupo. Una vez que se establece el estereotipo la escena está lista para la creación de bromas étnicas.

El folklor humorístico tiene muchas funciones entre las que se encuentran: 1) escape de la tensión y frustración del individuo; 2) afirmación de los nexos de grupo y reafirmación de las fronteras del grupo por ataque al extraño; 3) un medio de explorar fronteras; 4) un medio de exploración de la cercania potencial (la broma inoportuna se ve de esta manera; a menudo la posición relativa, socioeconómica, determina si la broma se ha de considerar como una amenaza o precursora de acercamiento). El folklor humorístico nos puede ayudar a reconocer y explorar las fronteras que experimentamos pero es incapaz de transcenderlas. La transcendencia puede llegar solamente cuando la gente se siente en terreno similar social y económicamente hablando.

NOTES

1 William Hugh Jansen, "The Esoteric-Exoteric Factor in Folklore," in *The Study of Folklore,* ed. Alan Dundes (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1965), p. 45. Originally published in *Fabula* 2 (1959), 205-211.

2 Ibid., p. 46

3 Fredrik Barth, ed., *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (Boston, 1969), pp. 9-11.

4 Lester V. Berrey and Melvin Van den Bark, *The American Thesaurus of Slang,* 2nd. ed. (New York, 1956).

5 Richard W. Howell, *Teasing Relationships* (Reading, Mass., 1973), p. 17b.

6 Américo Paredes, "The Anglo-American in Mexican Folklore," in *New Voices in American Studies,* ed. Ray Browne (Lafayette, Ind., 1966), pp. 113-127.

7 Ibid., p. 127.

8 Richard Bauman, "Differential Identity and the Social Base of Folklore," in *Toward New Perspectives in Folklore,* ed. Américo Paredes and Richard Bauman (Austin, 1972), pp. 31-41.

9 Howell, p. 18a.

10 Ibid., p. 17a.

UNITED STATES-MEXICAN RELATIONS IN THE 1970's: THE PERSISTENT PROBLEMS OF THE BORDER

by Michael C. Meyer, Ph.D., Director for Latin American Studies, University of Arizona, Tucson

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A matter too often overlooked in international problem solving is the historical ambience in which specific problems must be considered. It strikes me that there is a general tendency on the part of us all to view specific problems in specific vacuums, with insufficient thought given to public moods, public pressures, national sensitivities and the overriding consideration of how we arrived at where we are. Attempts to resolve the Palestinian question without appreciation of the State of Israel in 1948, or to paliate tensions in South Africa and Rhodesia outside of the context of the impact of the European colonial legacy, are doomed to failure. Similarly, the entire spectrum of United States-Mexican relations in the 1970's must be considered within the constraints of context.

If historians are sometimes asked to participate in public policy debates it is not because they have any special expertise or because their crystal ball is less clouded than that of any other group of social scientists. Oriented toward the past, both by training and predeliction, they are perhaps less qualified than others to plot out courses of *future* action. If historians have *anything* to offer, it is that they have a way of assessing human reality unique in the social science. Unlike political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, geographers, psychologists, and economists, each of whom brings a different mode of analysis to the human condition, the historian believes that institutions, systems of belief, and relationships between social groups and indeed the community of nations are best understood in the context of the passage of time. Social conditions are not static—they evolve. If one concedes the initial hypothesis that realistic solutions to difficult problems must be predicated at least in part on an appreciation of how we arrived at where we are, then it is useful to reflect for a moment on the recent history and interrelations of the United States and Mexico. Although I contend that many of the problems the United States faces in Mexico today have very deep roots, extending even into the colonial period, but certainly since the war between the two countries in the middle of the last century, I have decided to limit my analysis to the post World War II period, hoping that this rather arbitrary but defensible periodization will provide a sufficiently instructive time perspective into which we can interject a few questions worthy of consideration.

The United States and Mexico emerged from World War II with better relations than at any other time since the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution in 1910. The ultimate resolution of the oil controversy which had erupted with the expropriations in 1938 had assured Mexican cooperation for the war effort. During the war, Mexico gave the United States everything Washington could have hoped for. Not least of these contributions was Mexican labor in the United States under the aegis of the Bracero program. But with the advent of the cold war—and let's date that arbitrarily as covering the years 1945 to 1960—different sets of priorities placed the two countries on different paths. These paths did not point the countries toward a collision course, but they did make international problems of greater and lesser magnitude more difficult to resolve amicably.

I would guess that if historians a generation or two from now—with the advantage of greater perspective—were asked to delineate these factors which impacted most heavily on the development of the two countries in the thirty years following the war, they would select for the United States the Korean War, the Vietnam War and Watergate. For Mexico, they would more likely suggest the modernization impulse, the tremendously high net rate of population increase, and Mexico's alliance, partially in rhetoric but partially in reality, with the nations of the Third World. Those factors influencing both countries almost equally were economic pressures (including but not limited to inflation), natural resource scarcity, and a rebellion of young people challenging traditional values. It is then within this general context that confrontations between the two countries had to be resolved and without question, these factors complicated satisfactory resolutions.

What have been the nature of the leading problems between the two countries and how successful have the negotiators been in resolving them? In general, those problems affecting the border only indirectly have been more soluble. Major steps have been undertaken to minimize the problems of the theft, for sale in the United States, of Mexican pre-Columbian artifacts and historical documents. Cooperation to stop the spread of animal diseases—aftosa, screworm and Venezuelan encephalomeyelitis—has been excellent. A major treaty has been negotiated to resolve the Colorado River problem—a desalinization plant will be built in Arizona to assure quality water for Mexican users. The complex Chamizal issue, long a source of irritation to Mexican national sensitivities, was settled by treaty in 1970 and should now be consigned to the category of issues resolved.

Most recently, public announcements from Mexico City and Washington allowed that another source of irritation, the presence and treatment of United States prisoners in Mexico and of Mexican prisoners in the United States, was under review with the hope of resolution through a comprehensive prisoner exchange program. The details are far from being worked out as the legal implications—for example, different practices on double jeopardy and parole and exclusionary rules for evidence—are immense. Yet, important initial first steps have been taken and, although this is going to take some time, one can be optimistic about ultimate resolution.

The most insoluble problems have all been border problems in the strictest usage of that term. I am referring specifically to the illegal movement of drugs and people across the boundary line. On the surface the two seem similar, but when examined in any depth they reveal themselves as essentially disparate in nature and certainly call for a different kind of solution.

The drug problem is predominately a law enforcement problem and, in spite of the highly publicized spraying of herbicides in poppy-fields and the binational rhetoric of cooperation, little concrete has been offered in the way of solution. Mexican heroin still makes up about three-quarters of the heroin consumed in the United States. Some estimates are even higher. Even in this seemingly unrelated situation the impact of Watergate, and most importantly its attendant revelations concerning abuse of power by intelligence agencies, have resulted in less than full cooperation by Mexican and United States law enforcement officials.

Many of my Mexican colleagues inside of academia and friends without believe deeply that the DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration) is at worst a front for the CIA and at best infiltrated by CIA operatives. Even three or four years ago, most of us could have laughed this off as paranoia or some exotic conspiracy theory, but today it is not quite so easy to dismiss it on these grounds. Personally, I doubt if there is much basis for the first apprehension but I do not doubt the second. Whether or not there is basis for the allegations, policy makers and those in charge of implementing policy must concern themselves with the impression of impropriety. In my own field, historians often find it necessary to concern themselves with myths because if they have basis in fact, or if they do not, they influence human responses to certain stimuli and thus must be confronted. And in this case, it is undeniable that understandable suspicions have obviated the best cooperative efforts in the field of eliminating extensive drug smuggling across the international border.

The movement of illegal *people* across the border is even more complex and is directly tied to a combination of factors I delineated at the outset as characterizing the development of both countries in the post war period. Illegal immigration is related to Mexico's tremendously high rate of net population increase in a way too obvious to dwell upon. Suffice it to say that almost 700 thousand new Mexican workers enter the job market every year. In addition, it is tied to the modernization impulse as each dollar an illegal immigrant sends back home is one dollar that can be subtracted from Mexico's balance of payment deficit. The balance of payment deficit, complicated by the Jewish boycott and a general slump in tourist earnings, was over 3 billion dollars last year. Finally, shortage of energy sources including electric power and petroleum (in spite of doubling production since 1970) have decelerated the rate of economic development in Mexico, limited industrial expansion, especially in the private sector, and thus contributed to high unemployment. Unemployment and underemployment now collectively affect about 45 percent of Mexico's work force of 16 million people.

Unlike the drug problem, the illegal immigration problem is not primarily a law enforcement problem, it's a people problem. It might be a law enforcement problem if legislation were passed in this country making it illegal for employers to hire illegals but we all know that this is not the case; it is the illegals—not the employers—who suffer when they are caught. There are some serious problems with the Rodino Bill, four times defeated in the Eastland Committee, but its more important principle, making it illegal to hire illegals, seems to me sound. It might also be a law enforcement problem if employers were forced to pay the illegals the minimum wage. Again, this is not the case. And finally, and most importantly, it might be a law enforcement problem if the judicial system in this country concerned itself with granting illegals the protections afforded them under the Bill of Rights. It is extremely significant

that the first ten amendments to the Constitution, and the fourteenth, refer to people and persons–not citizens: "Congress shall make no law abridging the right of *people* peacefully to assemble;" "The right of *people* to be secure in their persons, homes, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated;" "No *person* shall be held to answer for a capital crime unless on an indictment of a grand jury. . .;" And most importantly, the Fourteenth Amendment "Nor shall any state deprive any *person* of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor deny any *person* within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

The law makers who drafted the Bill of Rights (ratified in 1791) and the Fourteenth Amendment (ratified in 1868) were much too sophisticated to have said *persons* and *people* if they intended citizens. And, I doubt if there is a respected constitutional lawyer in the country who would disagree. Yet, by common acquiescence, illegals are commonly denied the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to alien and citizen alike.

The solution to the illegal alien problem is not likely to be found in more electronic devices along the border or more airplane and helicopter overflights. These are simply sophisticated equivalents of breaking the illegal stills in south Chicago during prohibition and in the last analysis will be no more successful. Similarly, sending the illegals to their home village, rather than just across the border, is nothing more than a delaying tactic. The disease–not the symptom–must be confronted, and the only way to accomplish that is to remove the incentives for illegal immigration. The suggestion which Dr. Jorge Bustamante made last summer, giving import preferences to Mexican agricultural goods from regions of high unemployment, has merit. If the Commerce Department has acted on the proposal, however, I haven't heard about it.

All of us here, I think, have some ideas about the impact of the recent devaluation of the peso, the first since 1954. I'm sure that business has suffered in San Diego much as it has in Tucson. But while San Diego and Tucson, and San Antonio and El Paso have felt the impact, they are all large enough, and economically viable enough, to withstand the effect of even a prolonged reduction of Mexican dollar power. The same is not true of small towns on the border. Business in Nogales and Douglas, Arizona, and in Eagle Pass, Laredo, and Brownsville, Texas, has fallen from 35 to 65 percent, if one can rely on statistics released by individual Chambers of Commerce. Maybe some of the economists here can tell us if guaranteed loans from the World Bank or the Inter-American Development Bank can shore up the peso sufficiently to off-set the trend. But to my knowledge, nobody has yet analyzed the potential impact of the devaluation on the illegal immigrant problem. What we do know is that the premium for dollars is at a new high and therefore the risks one is willing to take to earn dollars is also at a new high. With increased financial pressures in Mexico, one could expect that illegal immigration will increase in the months ahead, certainly not decrease.

What we find here is the almost stereotypic historical confluence of political and economic issues to exacerbate a problem already serious. I am by nature uncomfortable when placed in the position of doomsday prophet, but I am no more at ease in the position of ostrich with head buried in the sand. I am too inherently optimistic to place much credence in the rhetoric of imminent race war in the Southwest, but I am sufficiently concerned to recognize the

need to begin developing imaginative and realistic solutions to the series of problems which confront the border area.

Una mirada a la historia reciente de las relaciones entre los EE. UU. y México dará profundo conocimiento en cuanto a cómo hemos llegado hasta donde estamos.

México y los EE. UU. emergieron de la Segunda Guerra Mundial con mejoras relaciones que las que tenían desde el brote de la Revolución de 1910. Durante la guerra México estuvo cooperando mucho con Washington, enviando aun personal para equilibrar la escasez laboral en los EE. UU., por medio del programa de braceros. Con el advenimiento de la guerra fría (1945-1946) los dos países siguieron cada cual por su camino. El rumbo del desarrollo de los EE. UU. estuvo saturado de la influencia de las guerras de Corea y Vietnam y el caso de Watergate, en tanto que México sobrellevó el peso de un impulso de modernizarse combinado con una red extremadamente alta en el índice de aumento de la población y un aumento enlazos con las naciones del tercer mundo. Las presiones económicas, la escasez de recursos naturales y los retos de la juventud a los valores tradicionales, eran influencias que hacían su impacto en ambos países de igual manera. Estos factores complicaron posteriormente la solución de problemas comunes.

La naturaleza de los principales problemas binacionales que ha de ser considerada por México y los EE. UU. puede resumirse como sigue: 1) hurto de artefactos precolombinos y de documentos históricos para su venta en EE. UU. 2) control de la propagación de enfermedades en los animales; 3) los problemas del Río Colorado (se va a construir una planta desaladora en Arizona para proveer a México de agua de calidad; 4) el caso del Chamizal terminado en tratado de 1970; 5) trato de presos americanos en México y de presos mexicanos en los EE. UU. (al presente se hace una revisión con mucha esperanza a un comprensivo programa de intercambio de presos en el futuro); 6) el movimiento ilegal de drogas a través de la frontera (un problema de aplicación de la ley); 7) el movimiento ilegal de gente a través de la frontera (esencialmente es un problema de población aunque se podrían desarrollar ciertos factores que colocarían esto en la categoría de aplicación de la ley, tal es el pasaje en el Escrito de Rodino; y 8) el impacto de la devaluación del peso.

Necesitamos empezar a desarrollar soluciones imaginativas y realistas para estos problemas político económicos a que se enfrentan las áreas fronterizas y de esta manera mejorar las relaciones entre nuestras dos naciones en un plan más amplio.

IMPACT OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRATION FROM MEXICO ON THE U.S.-MEXICAN ECONOMIES

by Jorge Bustamante, Ph.D., sociologist on the faculty of El Colegio de Mexico

Dr. Bustamante is an expert on the subject of border problems and populations. He specializes in the human side of the illegal alien situation. To complete a study of wetbacks, he made an actual crossing with aliens.

Introduction:

Illegal or undocumented immigration to the United States, particularly that which originates in Mexico, has once again gained considerable attention in the U.S. mass media. People hear about this phenomenon throughout the country as an "invasion of illegal aliens" (Withmore 1976), a "silent invasion" (Fitzhugh 1976; Jansen 1976), a case of "national crisis" (*New York Times* 1974), and a "burden of 13 billion dollars for tax payers" (*U.S. News & World Report* 1976). Yet, social scientists saying how little they know about it have hardly been heard.

This paper focuses on three aspects of undocumented immigration from Mexico to the United States. Firstly, a statement on the state of the art as regards empirical research on this phenomenon; secondly, a review of what we know about some of the characteristics of this migration and the presentation of preliminary findings of a survey conducted by the author in nine Mexican border cities, based on interviews with Mexican undocumented immigrants recently deported from the United States; and thirdly, a discussion of past attempts to solve the problem and some suggestions for the future.

The State of the Art:

It is noteworthy that the high visibility of the undocumented immigration from Mexico repeatedly coincides with times of unemployment in the United States. Abraham Hoffman (1974) in the United States and Mercedes Carreras (1975) in Mexico have documented the anti-Mexican-aliens campaigns of the 1930s, which preceded massive deportations of Mexican immigrants. Increasing unemployment after the end of the Korean War coincided again with headings such as "Current Year Problems: Mass Invasion by Illegal Aliens" (Senator Lehman 1954), or "Border Invasions Declared a Peril" (*New York Times* 1954). Close to a dozen articles in the *New York Times* alone and a special documentary by CBS Radio Network (April 4, 1954) spoke in alarming terms of the "Wetback Problem" in the first months of 1954. The high visibility given to the Mexican undocumented immigration in the mass media also preceded what was called "Operation Wetback," "commanded" by General Joseph May Swing (Samora 1971, pp. 51-55). One year after it started, June 17, 1954, more than

a million apprehensions and subsequent "voluntary departures" of Mexican undocumented immigrants were recorded by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.

The alarmed remarks we hear these days in reference to Mexican immigration show a recurring pattern: (1) a causal relationship is implied between high rates of unemployment and the presence of undocumented immigrants; (2) a notion of a threat is attached to this presence, (3) restrictive legislation on immigration is promoted, and (4) massive deportations are conducted. An additional factor in this pattern could also be noted: (5) the problem remains unsolved.

One could ask what the role of the social scientist has been in the changing visibility of an issue of such national concern. It is evident that social scientists have had a negligible role in molding public opinion about undocumented immigration from Mexico. It is also true that empirical research in this area is in sharp contrast with the number of impressionistic reports, individual case essays, and "experts' " opinions based on nothing more than "street wisdom," as was found by Meyer (*Washington Post,* February 2, 1975). What has been called a matter of national crisis has remained unmeasured and ill-defined.

We still do not know how many undocumented immigrants there are or what impact they have on either the U.S. or the Mexican economy. The estimates repeatedly used by INS authorities are based on the conclusions of the Lesko Associates report (1975), which coincides with previous estimates of the INS (Bustamante 1976). The methodology and the conclusions of the Lesko report have been severely criticized and the content of this study is no longer accepted within academic circles. The question of the volume of this flow has been a recurring preoccupation, however, ever since the first empirical studies on the phenomenon of Mexican immigration to the United States were conducted (Clark 1908; Bogadus 1929; Taylor 1929; Gamio 1930; Block 1939).

In the last three decades, the number of empirical studies have not corresponded to the prominence given the issue of undocumented immigration from Mexico by the mass media. There were two field studies published in the fifties (President's Commission on Migratory Labor 1951; and Saunders and Olin 1951). Two other solid empirical studies appear in the sixties (Galarza 1964; and Grebler 1966). The seventies are more promising in this respect. The studies of David North (1970) and Julian Samora (1971) have opened new avenues of empirical research, emphasizing the complexities of the phenomenon of Mexican immigration.

More recently we find the field work studies of the Mexican Comisión Intersecretarial para el Estudio de los Problemas de los Trabajadores Migratorios Mexicanos en los Estados Unidos, hereafter referred to as Comisión Intersecretarial (1972; 1974; 1975). They interviewed deported undocumented immigrants as they were released by the INS in eight Mexican border cities. In addition to the still small number of empirical studies conducted by Mexican researchers, we find one by Bustamante (1975) and another by Alba (1976).

In the recent field work that has been conducted in the United States, the report released by the U.S. Department of Labor by North and Houstoun (1976) figures prominently. The findings of this report led the *Wall Street Journal* on June 18, 1976 to observe that the U.S. government is receiving more from the undocumented immigrants in the form of tax and social security deductions

than the immigrants are receiving in public services. North and Houstoun found that 77 percent of the Mexican undocumented immigrants of their sample have paid Social Security and 73 percent have paid federal income tax. Less than 4 percent had children in U.S. schools, and only half of 1 percent had received welfare benefits. It is difficult to explain how the Inner City Fund (ICF), a Washington-based consultant firm for the INS, oblivious to these findings, concludes that the presence of illegal aliens costs the tax payers 13 billion dollars. How was this figure arrived at? It is known that this estimate is not drawn from any field or empirical research. Rather, it appears that ICF made some assumptions which were then applied to the discredited results of the Lesko study.

Unlike the Lesko study findings, the findings of North and Houstoun are consistent with another piece of field research (Villalpando 1975), which was largely conducted in San Diego County. Villalpando conducted a thorough evaluation of 9,132 welfare recipient cases in the County and found that only 10 were undocumented immigrants. Using the same procedures for evaluation, Villalpando found among 14,000 welfare recipient cases in Los Angeles County 56 illegal aliens. Out of these figures, 54 were determined to have actually been eligible for welfare assistance according to current regulations (Villalpando 1976). The significance of these findings is emphasized by Villalpando, who notes that San Diego County represents 33 percent of the total apprehensions in the U.S.-Mexico border area and 25 percent of the nation's total.

Recently there have been other empirical studies focusing on economic assimilation and socio-cultural aspects of the undocumented immigration phenomenon. These are respectively the studies by Moore (1975) and by Stoddard (1976). The former deals with local conditions in the Los Angeles area, and the latter with the Texas border.

Focusing on the socio-economic conditions of immigrants in San Antonio, Gilberto Cardenas of the Pan-American University (a different Cardenas than Gilberto Cardenas of University of Texas-Austin), conducted research which has demonstrated the difficulties and methodological problems of household survey in the United States of undocumented immigrants. This underlines the difficulties that will be faced by the Washington firm which has just received a 750 thousand dollar contract from INS to do precisely the same kind of household survey.

There are two promising research projects in progress. One is being conducted by Alejandro Portes of Duke University and the other by Wayne Cornelius of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The former is a longitudinal study, which deals with conditions of assimilation on a comparative basis. The latter focuses on a region of Mexico (Los Altos de Jalisco) which has an old tradition of emigration to the United States.

In addition, El Colegio de Mexico has just initiated a research project directed by the author which will be a national survey of internal and international outmigration. Its basic objectives are: (1) to determine the volume of emigration from Mexico to the United States, both of documented and undocumented migrants, (2) to assess the cost and benefits of this migratory phenomenon both from the point of view of the migrants and of the Mexican economy, and (3) to determine the socio-economic conditions both in Mexico and in the United States in order to better orient policy-making at the national and international level. A pilot study will be initiated this January and the full-scale

survey is scheduled to be conducted in the months of return migration, between September and December. This study seeks to overcome one of the most serious shortcomings of previous research, a shortcoming that we label lack of representativeness. No one so far has been able adequately to represent without bias, in statistical terms, the flow of Mexican undocumented immigration as a whole. This problem has a number of component parts. The first component, given marked attention by Julian Samora in 1971 (Los Mojados: The Wetback Story, pp. 56-57) is that INS apprehensions are events and are not the same as individuals. The second component is that the apprehended immigrant does not necessarily have the same characteristics as those who escape undetected. In this vein, INS officials have admitted in Congressional Hearings that the number of apprehensions is more a function of changes in the size of the Border Patrol personnel than of changes in the real number of undocumented immigrants (U.S. House of Representatives, Ninety-fourth Congress 1975, p. 5). It is clear from INS's own admissions that apprehensions data cannot be used to generalize from without incurring an unknown degree of bias.

Another aspect of the representativeness of data arises from local or regional studies, be they in Mexico or in the United States. Since we do not know the parameters of the universe of undocumented immigrants from Mexico, it is impossible to state how representative such regional studies might be.

What is badly needed, both for scientific purposes and for policy making, is a data base representative of the phenomenon as a whole. El Colegio de Mexico's project seeks to fill this gap through a national sample whose basic assumptions will be tested through pilot studies before final implementation.

To conclude this section, we could note that what is still undetermined about the undocumented immigration from Mexico is still more important than what we presently know (although it might be added that significant improvements have been made in this decade). Social scientists need to be heard more about how little they actually know about this.

What We Know on the Actual Conditions of the Phenomenon:

Some progress has been made in defining the socio-economic characteristics of undocumented immigrants from Mexico. There are three major sources of data based on research of a comprehensive scope in this field. First, the Samora study (1971); second, the series of reports of the Comision Intersecretarial (1972; 1974; and 1975); and thirdly, the North and Houstoun report (1976) recently released by the U.S. Department of Labor.

This section will attempt to describe some of the socio-economic characteristics, making, where possible, comparisons among the three sources. In addition, we will present some preliminary findings of a survey conducted by the author in nine Mexican border cities in the months of November and December of 1975.

Characteristics of Departure:

It could be inferred from Graph 1 that the local conditions associated with emigration have not been static. The Mexican states included in this graph represent approximately 80 percent of the total outmigration detected each year by the sources indicated in the graph. Data shown in this graph suggest the necessity of studying the conditions as they differ among the states of origin.

The considerable heterogeneity shown among the graphs underscores that emigration is a very uneven process, and that the nation cannot be treated as an homogeneous whole.

It is interesting to note the changes shown in the percentages for the states of Chihuahua, Michoacan, Sonora, and Sinaloa (see map) from 1974 to 1975. These contrast sharply with the downward trends of the rest of the states in the same period. The increases shown by Sonora and Sinaloa coincide with decreases in agricultural production in the same states for this period. It is possible that these decreases affect the availability of jobs sought not only by people in Sinaloa and Sonora but by the migrants from Michoacan. If it is true that internal migration from Michoacan to Sinaloa and Sonora is associated with emigration from Michoacan to the United States, the trends of these three states could be related to an economic situation derived from agricultural production in Sinaloa and Sonora. The easier access to the United States from Michoacan via Sinaloa and Sonora, and the highly rural composition of the migrants from Michoacan (see Table 1), could be associated with the impact of agricultural production upon job opportunities and the volume of emigration to the United States from these states.

Graph 1 also shows that there are five states that invariably appear in the statistics as sharing the largest proportion of the totals of undocumented immigration to the United States. With small variations in the order of predominance, these states are Guanajuato, Chihuahua, Michoacan, Zacatecas, and Jalisco. They appear to have provided more than half of the total of INS detected undocumented emigration from Mexico ever since 1969. No significant mobility is shown in the majority of these states' migrants, with the exception of Chihuahua. Table 1 shows that the majority of the migrants of the other four states with the largest emigration were born and have their actual residence in rural communities.

We looked for some variations in the data controlling for state of birth and state of actual residence. Table 1 shows some variations in the rural-urban origin not exceeding 5 percent on the average for the seven Mexican states with the highest proportion of undocumented immigrants to the United States. What is most interesting about this is the indication of a consistent pattern of urban to rural migration. Some statistical tests were conducted of this and found that at the 90 percent level of confidence, the differences are just barely significant. We cannot draw any hard and fast conclusions on this. Based on our data, however, it seems to be tenable to hypothesize that a small proportion of Mexican undocumented immigrants somehow emigrated, either before or after entering the United States from an urban to a rural place in Mexico. These apparent patterns are more intriguing since one would assume the opposite pattern to be more likely; that is, a loss of the number of rural emigrants when controlled for place of birth and place of residence.

Table 1 seems to confirm the notion that the majority of undocumented immigrants are of a rural origin. Out of the seven states with the largest emigration, Chihuahua appears as an exception in its rural-urban composition, with more than two-thirds of its emigrants coming from urban communities. This is probably influenced by the size of Ciudad Juarez population, which is approximating to a million very rapidly.

Employment-Unemployment:

The column on employment in Mexico of Table 1 suggests two situations: one, the high unemployment among emigrants, reaching as high as 79.5 percent among those who reside in the state of Jalisco; and two, that approximately one-third of the emigrants from the seven states with the largest emigration had a job at the time of departure. This probably reflects the effect not only of unemployment but of other factors upon the decision to emigrate. Very likely among these factors are low wages and low standards of living.

If our interviews in nine Mexican border cities (n=919) reflect the cities' unemployment situation (this would be the case if INS deportations to Mexican border cities are based on undocumented immigrants' place of origin as it has been claimed in the rationale for the selection of who is sent to the interior of Mexico), the figures in Table 2 would suggest that unemployment at the Mexican border among undocumented immigrants is worst in the largest border cities, Ciudad Juarez and Tijuana, with the case of Piedras Negras thrown in.

With the reservation stated above, Tables 1 and 2 could be a basis for comparision between unemployment on the Mexican border and in the interior of Mexico among undocumented immigrants if it is kept in mind what we have stated earlier in regard to the limitations of the data originated from individuals detected by the INS.

The same reasoning applies to our data on the question: Were you employed in the United States last year? We think that this is a better question than: did you have a job when caught? which we have asked in the past (Samora 1971). Both INS data on apprehensions and our previous studies data have shown that approximately 55 percent of those that were caught did not have a job—a factor commonly overlooked by those who leave their job in Mexico to enter the United States illegally. This percentage appears reduced in general terms when the question refers to the last year's experiences, as shown in Table 1. The situation appears different, however, when one looks at the emigrants in the Mexican border towns (see Table 2). Our data by state of origin refers only to interviews conducted in Matamoros, precisely where employment experience in the U.S. last year appears by far to have been the best among the emigrants interviewed in the nine Mexican border cities.

Table 3 compiles data from the Comision Intersecretarial reports on the employment background of undocumented immigrants. These data show some changes taking place over the years in the occupational composition of these migrants. Notwithstanding that farmworking occupations still represent the majority of undocumented immigrants' employment background, the proportion of farm workers in the total of emigrants has been decreasing progressively. When the occupational background is broken down by the large occupational categories of agriculture, industry, and services, we find in the Comision Intersecretarial's data that 57.4 percent of the total of interviewees in 1972 (n=2,794) were in agriculture in Mexico. By 1974, the percentage in the same category had decreased to 53.6 percent (n=1,316), and in 1975 it went to 46.9 percent (n=1,658).

Comparing the findings of the Comision Intersecretarial with those of the North and Houstoun study in the area of employment, we find that there does

not appear to be a correspondence between the occupational background in Mexico and the type of job found in the United States among the undocumented immigrants. Even in the cases where the immigrant lists other than agricultural skills, he is found absorbed by farmworking activities in his occupational experience in the United States (Comision Intersecretarial 1972, North and Houstoun 1976, Table V-5). This suggests an apparent selectivity of the U.S. labor demand for undocumented immigrants and the negligible effect that occupational background has on this selectivity. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that percentages in the occupational categories of industry and services have been rising consistently, as shown in Table 3.

Time Spent in the United States

Our preliminary findings on this variable might have an undetermined sample bias derived from the place the interviews occurred. Mexican undocumented immigrants apprehended by the INS are not sent back to Mexico on a random basis. Place of origin, as stated by the individual who is apprehended, is used by INS as a criterion for the destination of the undocumented immigrant released. He who states that he is from the interior of Mexico is shipped back non-stop by bus or by plane to a city of the interior, with the rationale that this will make his return to the United States more difficult. This practice, parenthetically, is in flagrant violation of the Mexican constitution, which establishes the basic right of free transit of individuals within the country. The practice usually involves the INS and a Mexican busline or airline contracted for the compulsive transportation of the undocumented immigrant from the Mexican border, where INS delivers him to the Mexican busline, to the interior of Mexico previously agreed upon between the INS and the Mexican busline or airline. It has been in existence ever since the last years of President Diaz Ordaz administration. It is a different practice, however, than the currently allegedly experimental airlift program by which INS sends back to Mexico undocumented immigrants in regular flights of commercial airlines. The basic difference between the two practices is that the older program involves the payment of the ticket from the immigrant's pocket when caught with enough money, and the newer involves what has been called, with a peculiar sense of humor, a champagne flight on INS's account. Both programs have one thing in common, no evidence has been found of their impact upon the undocumented immigration flow.

Those who state their residences are in the Mexican border cities are released by INS across the border. This is the group to which belonged our 919 interviewees. Presumably because of this factor of residence, whose validity we did not determine, the group which stayed less than thirty days (see Table 4) tends to be larger than has been shown in other studies (Samora 1971; North and Houstoun 1976), where some of the interviews had taken place in areas other than the Mexican border.

An interesting finding of our study derives from the question we asked on the accumulated duration of stay in the United States in 1975. Unfortunately, we were not able to determine with a minimum of reliability how many returns to Mexico, voluntary or otherwise, were involved with what duration in the number of days spent in the U.S. during 1975. Table 4 shows a frequency distribution in percentages of number of days of last staying. This time is

obviously overlapped by the average number of days spent in the U.S. during 1975, indicated in the corresponding column.

Figures from Table 4 require further statistical analysis, not yet completed. The frequency distribution shows, however, a lump at both extremes which suggests a contrast between two types of chances of being caught. The lump at the greater number of days is provoking a skewness of the average numbers indicated in the third column.

Some Aspects of the Cost and Benefit of the Undocumented Immigration:

The income obtained in the United States by the undocumented immigrant comes only from one source which is labor. Therefore, we will first focus on the benefit defined as income. Table 5 shows the average amount received by Mexican undocumented immigrants by state of origin. Looking at the data corresponding to residence by state (r.s.) in Table 5, it could be observed that the states with higher rural emigration (see Table 1) show a lower income. This suggests a probable effect of urbanization over skills and therefore over the likelihood of obtaining higher wages in the United States. It is important to observe, however, that only in the case of people whose place of origin is Mexico D.F.—with a too small number of cases in our sample to be certain—is yearly income in the United States higher than the average income for the nation, which is approximately $1,000 at the previous rate before September and subsequent devaluation of the peso. Because of this factor, however, any income in the United States is now double in pesos, what it was then our data were gathered. This suggests that the attraction of obtaining U.S. dollars might consequently be doubled. The effect of this attraction will be seen, probably beginning with next Spring, when the seasonal flow of immigration to the United States usually starts to augment, to reach a peak during the summer. A deterrent factor for the flow, however, drives from the inflationary effect on travel and living expenses. This will probably result in a case where poorest emigrants will be less likely to afford the trip to the United States than in the past.

Table 5 shows not only an apparent correspondence between closeness to the U.S.-Mexico border and lower travel expenses, but also that emigration involves a considerable cost that is higher than our previous studies have suggested (Samora 1971). If the situation described in Table 5 is close enough to reality, one could predict an increasing predominance of Mexican border states in the total of undocumented immigration. More speculative would be to predict a changing pattern of internal migration in Mexico with the alternative of going to the United States becoming more expensive for the lowest income emigrants from the states of the interior. That is, an increase of rural to urban migration, particularly to the Mexican metropolitan areas, coming from the states of Guanajuato, Michoacan, Jalisco, and San Luis Potosi and a consequent decrease in the emigration from these states to the United States. The assumption for this is that regardless of the increased attraction of the dollar, the cost of traveling to the United States will be too high for the most rural emigrants of the states of the interior of Mexico.

Paycheck Deductions for Taxes and Social Security and the Benefit From It:

Table 6 shows a breakdown of the group of undocumented immigrants who had jobs in the United States. As shown in this table, we found that only

7.7 percent of them received their wages in cash. Even though a cash payment does not mean that there can be no deductions for tax or Social Security, we decided to consider check-paid workers only for our analysis under the assumption that this would be easier to remember on a yes or no basis. Our findings are consistent with the reports of North and Houstoun (1976) and Villalpando (1975) in the sense that the Mexican undocumented immigrant indeed paid taxes and Social Security. Almost three-quarters of the check-paid workers had deductions for tax purposes and two-thirds for Social Security.

If representative data were available, the claim of a burden for taxpayers derived from the presence of the undocumented immigrant probably could be reversed. In theory, a case for an international court of law could be made by the Mexican government if the accumulated amount paid by Mexican immigrants in the form of income tax and Social Security to the U.S. Treasury could be determined. If our data are correct, in general they do not receive a proportional benefit in the form of public services for their money. If this were the case, it could be argued that the Mexican undocumented immigrants might have an uncollected balance in their favor chargeable to the U.S. Treasury.

The representativeness of our data is still undetermined, but they are consistent enough with the evidence from other studies (North and Houstoun 1976; Villalpando 1975) to suggest that charges against the Mexican undocumented immigrant being a burden for U.S. taxpayers are totally unfounded.

We have argued elsewhere (Bustamante 1976) that one of the dangers of allowing alarming statements in regard to Mexican immigration to go unchallenged by scientific research is that these statements become "definitions of the situation" for the general public in the sense delineated by sociologist W. I. Thomas. That is, when situations are defined as real, they are real in their consequences. The consequence of unfounded alarming statements on this migratory phenomenon might be certain kinds of behavior with no greater rationality than the burning of witches.

Some Suggestions for Partial Solutions:

Our mention of possibilities for irrational behavior deserves an effort in searching for rational solutions. Rationality, however, could be culture-bound when it refers, as the sociologist Max Weber pointed out, to substantive values of a culture. In the phenomenon of Mexican immigration, we not only find different cultures involved, but contrasting vested interests of groups with contrasting power. Thus, an effort in searching for rational solutions could be a matter of who's ends will be chosen with which to make proposed means congruent.

Some solutions have been attempted in the past, like the Bracero program or, less bilateral, massive deportations. Enough has been written on the history of the Bracero program, particularly by Ernesto Galarza (1964), to save a long discussion on its merits. A Bracero program would not be useful as a solution for the undocumented immigration, at least for the following reasons:

(1) It becomes an inducement for emigration from Mexico. In the past, those who were not able to be included in the Bracero quotas determined by the United States did not necessarily go home. They came to the United States as undocumented workers.

(2) It provokes an oversupply of labor that is conducive for conditions of exploitation, exacerbation of ethnic prejudice, and discrimination.

(3) It results in the lowering of wages and standards of living of national workers.

Restrictive measures such as reinforcing police actions and/or launching massive deportations have failed several times in the past. This has its basic weakness in the fact that a phenomenon which responds to the interaction of factors operating at the two sides of the border, basically, U.S. demands for cheap labor and unemployment in Mexico, cannot be solved by unilateral measures.

No attempts have been made so far to affect the roots of the problem in the international policy making. One side of the problem is Mexican unemployment. Not all unemployment, however, is related to the undocumented immigration to the United States. That immigration does not come from all over Mexico nor from all socio-economic strata. This means that the problem of unemployment that is associated to the undocumented immigration to the United States can be identified with the existing data. This being the case, the following is a suggestion to focus on a program for employment in Mexico based on concerted actions from the two sides of the border.

1. Creation of "units of production" of foodstuffs. Within the existing framework and policies of Mexican federal programs for development of the rural areas, a selection of strategic locations will be made for the establishment of units of production of food products. These will include the organization of systems of production based on labor intensive rather than capital intensive means for the processing of farm products.

2. Sources of capital. The initial sources of capital for these production units would be either the Mexican government directly or international agencies which finance development programs. The main reason for this is the traditional Mexican reluctance to participate in "foreign aid" programs.

3. U.S. imports as an immigration policy. The production of these units located in Mexico would be destined to the United States programs of foreign aid in food products to countries with whom agreements of this nature have been established. The purpose of this is two fold: to provide a source of capitalization that will not be dependent upon the forces of international marketing on the one hand, and to provide conditions of stability to the production units for the programming of long term patterns of production on the other.

The importation of these food production units by the U.S. government agencies should not be conceived as a commercial operation. Rather, it should be conceived as a measure to curb Mexican undocumented immigration. The expected volume of production of two years of an exploratory program would not be of a magnitude that would affect exports of regular U.S. agricultural production. Channeling U.S. imports of the Mexican units' production to U.S. foreign aid programs in foodstuffs will serve also the purpose of not competing with U.S. farmers in the U.S. internal market, which otherwise will make it necessary to increase the complexity of the organizational infrastructure of the Mexican production units or to make them dependent upon brokers.

4. Mexican production units' management. Preference in hiring practices would be given (1) to those with no record of apprehension in the U.S. by the INS after a certain date, and (2) to those within certain geographical areas.

The form of ownership of the units of production would be private; they would be collectively owned by a group of operators of the unit to whom the Mexican government will grant loans upon approval of the group's proposal for operation. The organization of revenues for the owners would correspond to a corporation format of a "Sociedad Anonima" within the Mexican Law.

Check points will be established by the Mexican financing agency to control the efficiency of each production unit.

A manpower training program will be created to fulfill the management necessities of the production units.

5. Duration of the U.S. imports program. After two years of an exploratory phase, U.S. imports will be extended three years, the fourth year being used as a transition period of mix operations both of exports within the regular program and sales into the Mexican national market or regular exports programs.

6. An additional concerted program for adjustment of migratory status for undocumented immigrants in the United States. This measure would correspond to the roots of the problem of undocumented immigrants located in the United States namely, US labor demands. The main task of the U.S.-Mexico concerted actions in this regard would be to orient those who do not qualify for adjustment of migratory status toward the production units in Mexico.

The main resistance for a program such as this one probably would come from U.S. farmers. The question would be, however, what the cost would be for the U.S. economy to establish such a program of imports of food products from the units in Mexico, and whether this program will curb undocumented immigration from Mexico at a lower price than the police type measures of massive deportations.

These units of production do not necessarily have to provide full employment in Mexico. They will have to demonstrate, however, (1) that the chance of obtaining a job and becoming a shareholder of a production unit is equal to or better than the actual chance of finding a job in the United States under new conditions resulting from the end of the adjustment of migratory status period; (2) that the cost of immigration to the U.S. without a visa includes the diminishing possibilities of gaining access to a unit of production; and (3) that the income derived from the units of production makes the risks involved in the immigration to the United States "sin papeles" less attractive or necessary.

Se discuten tres aspectos de inmigración sin documentos de México a EE. UU.: 1) exposición del arte en su relación con la investigación empírica de este fenómeno; 2) las características de migración y resultados preliminares de una encuesta realizada en nueve ciudades fronterizas, basada en entrevistas con mexicanos deportados de los EE. UU.; y 3) la discusión de intentos pasados para resolver problemas y sugerencias para los futuros.

Bajo "Exposición del arte" 1) se implica una relación causal entre el alto desempleo en EE. UU. y la presencia de inmigrantes sin documentos; 2) a esta presencia se adhiere una amenaza; 3) se promueve una legislación restrictiva de inmigración; 4) se efectúan deportaciones masivas; y 5) el problema permanece sin solución. Un informe remitido por el Departamento de Trabajo de los EE. UU. por North y Houstoun (1976) condujo al *Wall Street Journal* (6-18-76) a observar que el gobierno de los EE. UU. recibe de los inmigrantes sin documentos, en deducciones de impuesto y Seguro Social más de lo que ellos reciben en servicios públicos.

El Colegio de México acaba de iniciar un proyecto de investigación para vigilar la migración interna e internacional. Sus objetivos son: 1) determinar el volumen de emigración hacia los EE. UU., con y sin documentos; 2) declarar el costo y beneficios del fenómeno migratorio tanto desde el punto de vista de los emigrantes como de la economía mexicana; 3) determinar las condiciones socioeconómicas en México y los EE. UU. para confeccionar una política mejor orientada a nivel nacional e internacional.

Bajo "Condiciones del fenómeno" los índices en el cuerpo del escrito se explican y embellecen para un entendimiento posterior de los datos involucrados.

Por lo que a soluciones corresponde, la revitalización del programa de braceros no llenaría la necesidad por las siguientes razones: 1) se convertiría en un móvil para la inmigración de México; 2) provocaría un excesivo suplemento laboral y 3) resultaría en la rebaja de sueldos y el nivel de vida de los trabajadores americanos en los mismos empleos. El escrito sugiere un programa de empleo en México basado en la creación de "unidades de producción" de comestibles. El capital sería provisto ora por el gobierno mexicano ora por agencias internacionales que financian programas de desarrollo. Lo que produjeran estas unidades se destinaría a los programas de ayuda al extranjero de los EE. UU. con los países que se haya establecido acuerdo de esta naturaleza. La preferencia de empleo se daría 1) a quienes no tengan registro de aprehensión en los EE. UU. después de cierta fecha y 2) a aquéllos que residan dentro de ciertas áreas geográficas.

Las unidades de producción tendrían que demostrar: 1) que la oportunidad de obtener un empleo y convertirse en accionista de la unidad es igual o mejor que la oportunidad de encontrar un empleo en los EE. UU.; 2) que el costo de emigración a los EE. UU. sin visa incluye la posibilidad disminuyente de conseguir acceso en una unidad y 3) que el ingreso derivado de la unidad hace que los riesgos involucrados en la emigración a los EE. UU. sea menos atractiva.

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STATES OF MEXICO

1. Aguascalientes
2. Baja California Norte
3. Baja California Sur
4. Campeche
5. Coahuila
6. Colima
7. Chiapas
8. Chihuahua
9. Distrito Federal
10. Durango
11. Guanajuato
12. Guerrero
13. Hidalgo
14. Jalisco
15. Mexico
16. Michoacan
17. Morelos
18. Nayarit
19. Nuevo Leon
20. Oaxaca
21. Puebla
22. Queretaro
23. Quintana Roo
24. San Luis Potosi
25. Sinaloa
26. Sonora
27. Tabasco
28. Tamaulipas
29. Tlaxcala
30. Veracruz
31. Yucatan
32. Zacatecas

APPREHENDED UNDOCUMENTED MEXICAN IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES BY STATES OF ORIGIN*

(PART I)



*Percentages represent each state's portion of total undocumented immigration taken from both sources.
SOURCE: For the year 1970. Julian Samora. *Los Mojados: The Wetback Story*, Notre Dame Press. 1971. p.92; for the years 1972, 1974 and 1975. Reports of the Mexican Government's Interdepartmental Commission for the Study of Undocumented Immigration of Mexican Workers to the United States (unpublished material).

APPREHENDED UNDOCUMENTED MEXICAN IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES BY STATES OF ORIGIN*

(PART II)



*Percentages represent each state's portion of total undocumented immigration taken from both sources.
SOURCE: For the year 1970. Julian Samora. *Los Mojados: The Wetback Story*, Notre Dame Press. 1971. p.92; for the years 1972, 1974 and 1975. Reports of the Mexican Government's Interdepartmental Commission for the Study of Undocumented Immigration of Mexican Workers to the United States (unpublished material).

TABLE 1

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF A SAMPLE OF MEXICAN UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS

(November 1975)

State of origin		Number of interviews	%	Was employed in México at time of departure		Was employed in the U.S. last year		Community of origin	
				Yes %	No %	Yes %	No %	rural %	urban %
Guanajuato	b.s.(a)	103	26.5	29.1	69.9	70.9	29.1	54.4	44.7
	r.s.(b)	104	26.3	26.9	72.1	69.2	30.8	57.7	42.3
San Luis Potosi	b.s.	69	17.8	33.3	66.7	79.7	20.3	69.6	29.0
	r.s.	67	16.9	38.8	61.2	79.1	10.9	70.1	28.4
Jalisco	b.s.	43	11.0	27.9	72.1	81.4	18.6	72.1	27.9
	r.s.	39	9.9	20.5	79.5	89.7	10.3	74.4	25.6
Michoacan	b.s.	40	10.3	52.5	47.5	52.5	47.5	70.0	27.5
	r.s.	35	8.9	48.6	51.4	54.3	45.7	77.1	22.9
Zacatecas	b.s.	39	10.1	30.8	69.2	79.5	20.5	61.5	33.3
	r.s.	36	9.1	41.7	58.3	80.6	19.4	72.2	27.8
Durango	b.s.	24	6.2	33.3	66.7	79.2	20.8	58.3	37.5
	r.s.	18	4.6	27.8	72.2	72.2	27.8	72.2	22.2
Chihuahua	b.s.	11	2.8	36.4	63.6	63.6	36.4	36.4	63.6
	r.s.	15	3.8	33.3	66.7	66.7	33.3	33.3	66.7
Mexico, D.F.	b.s.	8	2.1	62.5	37.5	87.5	12.5	0	100.0
	r.s.	12	3.0	58.3	41.7	91.7	8.3	0	100.0
Queretaro	b.s.	8	2.1	50.0	50.0	75.0	25.0	50.0	37.5
	r.s.	8	2.0	37.5	62.5	75.0	25.0	62.5	37.5
Coahuila	b.s.	7	1.8	42.9	57.1	71.4	28.6	14.3	85.7
	r.s.	9	2.3	33.3	66.7	66.7	33.3	22.2	77.8
Aguascalientes	b.s.	7	1.8	57.1	42.9	85.7	14.3	28.6	57.1
	r.s.	9	2.3	44.4	55.6	66.7	33.3	22.2	66.7
Guerrero	b.s.	6	1.5	0	100.0	100.0	0	100.0	0
	r.s.	8	1.8	14.3	85.7	100.0	0	100.0	0
Tamaulipas	b.s.	5	1.3	60.0	40.0	60.0	40.0	0	100.0
	r.s.	11	2.8	27.3	72.7	63.6	36.4	18.2	81.8
Veracruz	b.s.	4	1.0	50.0	50.0	100.0	0	50.0	50.0
	r.s.			50.0	50.0	100.0	0	50.0	50.0
Sinaloa	b.s.	5	1.3	0	100.0	100.0	0	100.0	0
	r.s.			20.0	80.0	100.0	0	60.0	40.0
Nuevo Leon	b.s.		1.5	0	100.0	33.3	66.7	0	100.0
	r.s.	6		16.7	83.3	66.7	33.3	0	100.0
Other States	b.s.		0.9						
	r.s.		2.5						

SOURCE: Research Program on the Bi-national Border Region Mexico-U.S., Centro de Estudios Sociologicos, El Colegio de Mexico. Data obtained from the application of questionaires in Matamoros, Tamaulipas (November 1975) to undocumented migrant workers recently deported from the U.S.

(a) = b.s. - born in state
(b) = r.s. - resident in state

TABLE 2

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF A SAMPLE OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS
NOVEMBER 1975

Cities where Interviews were Conducted	Was Employed in Mexico at time of Departure to U.S.			Was Employed in U.S. Last Year			Number of Interviews	% of n=919
	Yes	No	No Answer	Yes	No	No Answer		
Cd. Reynosa								
absolute	14	18	0	17	13	2	32	
percentage	43.8	56.3	0	53.1	40.6	6.3		3.5
Matamoros								
absolute	137	263	1	297	104	0	401	
percentage	34.2	65.6	.2	74.1	25.9	0		43.6
Cd. Acuna								
absolute	57	102	0	59	95	5	159	
percentage	35.8	64.2	0	37.1	59.7	3.1		17.3
Gral. Rodrigo Ma. de Quevedo								
absolute	30	68	1	39	60	0	99	
percentage	30.3	68.7	1.0	39.4	60.6	0		10.8
Piedras Negras								
absolute	7	31	0	9	29	0	38	
percentage	18.4	81.6	0	23.7	76.3	0		4.1
Cd. Juarez								
absolute	9	36	0	17	27	1	45	
percentage	20.0	80.0	0	37.8	60.0	2.2		4.9
Nogales								
absolute	41	42	1	38	44	2	84	
percentage	48.8	50.0	1.2	45.2	52.4	2.4		9.1
Tijuana								
absolute	13	47	0	33	26	1	60	
percentage	21.7	78.3	0	55.0	43.3	1.7		6.5
Totals								
absolute	308	607	4	509	398	12	919	
percentage	33.5	66.1	.4	55.4	43.3	1.3		100.0

SOURCE: Interviews with undocumented emigrants detected by U.S. immigration authorities, conducted upon their return to eight Mexican border towns. November 1975.

TABLE 3

TYPE OF JOB HELD IN MEXICO BY UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS RECENTLY DEPORTED BY U.S. IMMIGRATION AUTHORITIES

(in percentages)

type of job	1972	1974	1975
employer or business owner	1.7	2.2	2.7
self employed	5.5	6.1	7.1
land holder (ejidatario)	4.4	12.9	4.3
landless agri-worker	43.1	35.1	35.6
industrial worker	15.8	17.5	21.5
services worker	17.8	18.0	18.6
wageless family worker	5.7	4.0	3.9
never employed before	6.1	4.2	6.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
n=	2,794	1,316	1,658

SOURCE: Questionaires applied in 1972, 1974 and 1975 respectively, in 8 border cities by the Interdepartmental Commission on problems derived from migratory currents of Mexican Workers to the U.S. (Mexican Government).

TABLE 4

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF A SAMPLE OF MEXICAN UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS

November 1975

State of origin		n=401	%	Average duration of stay in U.S. during 1975 (in days)	Time spent in U.S. before last apprehension (in days) frequency distribution in percentages of the total sample. 0	1to10	11to15	16to20	21to30	31to60	61to90	91to120	121to365	365to730
Guanajuato	b.s.(a)	103	26.5	158	1.0	17.5	6.8	6.8	7.8	10.7	14.6	6.8	22.3	3.5
	r.s.(b)	104	26.3	137	1.0	19.2	7.7	19.2	7.7	6.7	8.7	8.7	22.1	2.9
San Luis Potosi	b.s.	69	17.8	177	.0	17.4	11.6	1.4	13.0	5.8	7.2	10.1	26.1	5.8
	r.s.	67	16.9	181	.0	17.9	10.4	.0	14.9	6.0	6.0	10.4	26.9	6.0
Jalisco	b.s.	43	11.0	136	.0	16.3	11.6	.0	9.3	34.9	2.3	4.7	14.0	.0
	r.s.	39	9.9	138	.0	7.7	12.8	.0	10.3	38.5	2.6	5.1	17.9	.0
Michoacan	b.s.	40	10.3	111	2.5	22.5	10.0	2.5	10.0	20.0	7.5	2.5	22.5	.0
	r.s.	35	8.9	238	2.9	25.7	11.4	2.9	8.6	20.0	11.4	2.9	14.3	.0
Zacatecas	b.s.	39	10.1	225	.0	17.9	2.6	5.1	10.3	15.4	7.7	5.1	17.1	15.4
	r.s.	36	9.1	223	.0	13.9	2.8	5.6	13.9	16.7	8.3	5.6	13.9	16.7
Durango	b.s.	24	6.2	129	.0	25.0	4.2	.0	16.7	8.3	.0	20.8	25.0	.0
	r.s.	18	4.6	83	.0	33.3	5.6	.0	16.7	11.1	.0	22.2	11.1	.0
Chihuahua	b.s.	11	2.8	189	.0	.0	18.2	9.1	27.3	.0	.0	9.1	27.3	.0
	r.s.	15	3.8	195	.0	.0	13.3	6.7	26.7	.0	6.7	6.7	33.3	.0
Mexico, D.F.	b.s.	8	2.1	347	.0	12.5	.0	.0	12.5	12.5	.0	.0	25.0	25.0
	r.s.	12	3.0	352	.0	8.3	.0	.0	8.3	25.0	.0	.0	25.0	25.0
Queretaro	b.s.	8	2.1	123	.0	.0	.0	12.5	37.5	12.5	12.5	.0	25.0	.0
	r.s.	8	2.0	123	.0	.0	.0	12.5	37.5	12.5	12.5	.0	25.0	.0
Coahuila	b.s.	7	1.8	83	.0	57.1	.0	.0	.0	.0	28.6	.0	14.3	.0
	r.s.	8	2.3	142	.0	55.6	.0	.0	.0	.0	22.2	.0	11.1	.0
Aguascalientes	b.s.	7	1.8	234	.0	.0	.0	.0	14.3	14.3	14.3	.0	57.1	.0
	r.s.	9	2.3	184	.0	22.2	.0	.0	11.1	11.1	11.1	.0	44.4	.0
Guerrero	b.s.	6	1.5	288	.0	16.7	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	33.3	
	r.s.	8	1.8	270	.0	14.3	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	42.9	
Tamaulipas	b.s.	5	1.3	20	.0	40.0	.0	20.0	40.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0
	r.s.	11	2.8	128	.0	27.3	18.2	9.1	9.1	.0	9.1	9.1	9.1	.0
Veracruz	b.s.	4	1.0	311	.0	.0	.0	.0	25.0	.0	.0	25.0	25.0	.0
	r.s.			311	.0	.0	.0	.0	25.0	.0	.0	25.0	25.0	.0
Sinaloa	b.s.	5	1.3	245	.0	.0	.0	.0	33.3	.0	.0	.0	33.3	33.3
	r.s.			238	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	80.0	20.0
Nuevo Leon	b.s.		1.5	40	.0	.0	66.7	.0	.0	.0	33.3	.0	.0	.0
	r.s.	6		111	.0	.0	16.7	16.7	.0	16.7	16.7	16.7	16.7	.0
Other States	b.s.		0.9											
	r.s.		2.5											

SOURCE: Research Program on the Bi-national Border Region Mexico-U.S., Centro de Estudios Sociologicos, El Colegio de Mexico. Data obtained from the application of questionaires in Matamoros, Tamaulipas (November 1975) to undocumented migrant workers recently deported from the U.S.

(a) - b.s. - born in state
(b) - r.s. - resident in state

TABLE 5

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF A SAMPLE OF MEXICAN UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS

(November 1975)

State of Origin		n=401=100%		Travel expenses to the U.S. last year (a)	Debts left in Mexico last year (a)	Income in the U.S. last year (a)	Family expenditures per day in Mexico (a)	Respondent's expenditures per day in the U.S. (a)
Guanajuato	b.s.(b)	103	26.5	367.09	155.92	748.08	3.52	3.97
	r.s.(c)	104	26.3	352.98	142.62	799.80	3.50	4.06
San Luis Potosi	b.s.	69	17.8	475.79	144.29	757.04	2.73	4.34
	r.s.	67	16.9	386.94	98.75	756.66	3.96	4.30
Jalisco	b.s.	43	11.0	373.45	101.86	658.09	3.37	3.98
	r.s.	39	9.9	377.44	112.00	725.59	3.82	3.89
Michoacan	b.s.	40	10.3	392.31	130.10	554.50	5.87	3.84
	r.s.	35	8.9	271.14	104.69	549.14	3.85	4.03
Zacatecas	b.s.	39	10.1	326.97	140.22	848.82	3.62	4.45
	r.s.	36	9.1	303.44	139.06	873.44	3.70	5.69
Durango	b.s.	24	6.2	528.58	50.50	759.48	3.01	4.48
	r.s.	18	4.6	391.78	64.00	631.56	2.84	2.77
Chihuahua	b.s.	11	2.8	471.64	16.36	452.73	5.07	2.98
	r.s.	15	3.8	550.93	16.00	825.33	4.44	0.80
Mexico D.F.	b.s.	8	2.1	781.25	0	1 155.00	4.17	6.00
	r.s.	12	3.0	893.83	193.33	1 020.33	4.21	4.63
Queretaro	b.s.	8	2.1	333.50	204.00	887.50	5.29	3.67
	r.s.	8	2.0	339.00	204.00	875.00	5.74	3.79
Coahuila	b.s.	7	1.8	226.29	0	484.57	2.73	3.31
	r.s.	9	2.3	53.11	8.00	544.22	3.08	3.16
Aguascalientes	b.s.	7	1.8	555.43	696.00	1 480.00	3.19	6.39
	r.s.	9	2.3	443.11	548.00	1 151.11	2.86	8.92
Guerrero	b.s.	6	1.5	846.67	386.67	1 233.33	3.60	4.07
	r.s.	8	1.8	751.43	428.57	1 268.57	5.94	4.11
Tamaulipas	b.s.	5	1.3	65.20	24.00	149.20	6.08	1.92
	r.s.	11	2.8	67.64	165.45	489.64	6.87	4.65
Veracruz	b.s.	4	1.0	1 119.00	115.00	1 480.00	2.54	8.44
	r.s.			1 119.00	115.00	1 125.00	2.54	8.44
Sinaloa	b.s.	5	1.3	520.67	93.33	986.67	5.60	4.98
	r.s.			704.40	112.00	1 256.00	4.06	4.83
Nuevo Leon	b.s.			183.33	97.33	105.33	3.79	11.65
	r.s.	6	1.5	371.00	105.33	589.33	3.09	6.52
Other states	b.s.		0.9					
	r.s.		2.5					

SOURCE: Questionaire applied in Matamoros, Tamaulipas to undocumented immigrants recently deported by U.S. Immigration authorities.

(a) = averages converted into U.S. dollars at the January 1976 currency rate of 8 cents per peso
(b) = b.s. - born in state
(c) = r.s. - resident of state

TABLE 6

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF A SAMPLE OF MEXICAN UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS

Cities Where Sample Was Applied	FORM OF WAGE PAYMENT n=509				CHECK-PAID WORKERS n=433				TOTAL SAMPLE N=919								
									HAVE CHILDREN IN U.S. SCHOOLS			WELFARE RECIPIENT IN U.S.			FREE MEDICAL CARE RECIPIENT IN U.S.		
	cash	check	wages uncollected	no answer	tax deductions	Social Security deductions	no deductions	no answer	yes	no	no answer	yes	no	no answer	yes	no	no answer
Reynosa	1	16	2	0	18	8	4	2	0	32	0	0	32	0	1	31	0
Matamoros	18	258	21	10	191	178	48	13	3	388	10	18	269	10	32	359	10
Cd. Acuna	8	46	3	2	29	24	12	5	0	155	4	2	155	2	14	143	0
Cd. R.M. Quevedo	6	30	2	1	21	21	8	1	0	96	3	0	99	0	2	94	3
Piedras Negras	2	7	0	0	2	2	5	0	0	38	0	0	38	0	0	38	0
Cd. Juarez	0	17	0	0	16	12	1	2	0	45	0	0	45	0	3	42	0
Nogales	4	28	4	2	26	19	3	3	0	81	3	2	80	2	5	78	3
Tijuana	0	32	0	1	27	25	5	1	5	53	2	7	51	2	11	49	2
TOTALS	9	434	32	16	322	289	86	27	8	888	22	29	769	16	72	834	18
Percentages	7.7	85.3	6.3	3.1	74.4	66.7	19.9	6.2	0.9	96.6	2.4	3.2	83.7	1.7	7.8	90.7	1.9

SOURCE: Interviews with undocumented emigrants detected by U.S. Immigration authorities, conducted upon their return to eight Mexican border cities in November 1975.

U.S.-MEXICO TRADE AND INVESTMENT PROGRAMS

by Richard Silberman, private investor and former banker, San Diego

As an amateur student of affairs in Mexico and other foreign lands in which I have had the opportunity to visit and work, I have noticed that international problems are like molecular problems. There is a point at which you reach a critical mass. This point is not a linear phenomena of the evolution of time, but is principally a result of political actions and public perceptions. Therefore, while I may be pragmatic today, it is not in a context of trying to be parochial in my views and trying to look at problems as a northerner looking south. I will be trying to expose some phenomena that I think reflect American perceptions and I believe that knowledge of such perceptions is fundamental to the problems we are trying to solve.

I suppose that I also look at these questions with the view of a Californian who believes that in the next 20 years the principal problems of the state will concern our relations with Mexico in the context of the Mexican-American community of California. There are forecasts indicating that the largest single group of the population in this state in the next twenty years will be Mexican or Spanish surname groups. The events in our neighbor to the north, Canada, may indicate something that will evolve over the next fifteen or twenty years in California. It would not be surprising to me, if after two decades people begin talking about separatist movements both in California and in Mexico, and particularly in Baja California—especially if things don't change.

It is in this context that the time has come to be candid rather than philosophical. This is not a subject that lacks indexed study and research though I am impressed with Dr. Bustamante's comments that we cannot quantify many of the elements. There are times, however, in political and economic situations where quantification is not needed because instincts generally motivate political, economic or investment decisions.

I suppose that all of my feelings could be summarized simply by stating that, in my opinion, the relationships between the United States and Mexico have never been worse, at least since World War II. If we do not address ourselves to the elements that make these relationships what they are today, then the inherent problems of our relationship cannot be solved. I think it's very, very important to recognize that the economic problems related to the devaluation of the peso were not problems that occurred all of a sudden. Unfortunately, however, once the investment community and business community and the cultural and post-political elements that react to such change have been faced with such a step, it takes a long, long time to restore confidence.

What we see today is a situation where regardless of what we would like to do and regardless of what we would like to have time to do, we must look for

solutions even though this may be difficult politically and though we may be faced with a political reality that some may not be prepared to accept. There are some lessons in other countries to the South that I think are very important to us. A great deal of what has happened in Peru, Colombia and even Argentina, in my opinion, may spring from the fact that there has been inconsistency in the action allowed to political and business leaders in those countries and the actual results of their daily lives. We find in Mexico that there are two governments. There is a visible government which articulates philosophies and plans, and there is an invisible government with which you generally have to deal if you want to be part of any of those plans or policies. The result of such action causes the business process to become inefficient and it is also difficult to discern and define. In addition to that, in the last several years there has been an incredible lack of confidence in the Mexican economy on the part of Mexican investors and Mexican businessmen. One of the things people concerned with international banking and business follow is what businessmen are doing. domestically. It's always great to have visitors from a foreign country come to your country and tell you about the investment climate in that country. But if as they leave they open a bank account in your country and convert all their currency to your currency, you're curious about the reasons they're telling you to invest in their country.

We have a situation that is very visible in that regard. Any of us who have lived in San Diego for ten minutes can look to Coronado and ask why the number of investments in that one area by Mexicans have been made. What do they mean? What is a sign of confidence or lack of confidence? As private capital leaves any Latin country—or any country—in substantial amounts the fundamental economic structure of that country tends to deteriorate. We have a very high level of deterioration in the Mexican economy today.

It seems to me that the balance of payments problem is much deeper than a simple act on the part of one group to boycott Mexico as a result of an action in the United Nations or of the decline of tourism. It really is a manifestation of some very deep problems that have been going on quite a while. I feel that when we look at the relationships between the two countries today we have to deal with the very nebulous problem of lack of confidence.

In my opinion the perception of most people as they look to Mexico today is unfortunately not that of a neighbor with whom there is an attitude of cooperation. There is a very uncomfortable feeling toward our relationships with Mexico and while we have made progress in many areas since the Second World War it has not been enough. I don't think we can minimize the front page stories in the Wall Street Journal about the disappearance of an American woman in Acapulco. I recognize fully the rights and problems in Mexico that relate to prisoners and I understand that the laws of Mexico are different than the laws of the United States. On the other hand, viewed in the total framework it is a highly insensitive act when a prisoner's furlough to see his mother before she dies, requested by the governor of a state and the president of a nation, is refused.

The trouble with all these things is that they don't relate to equities, they relate to perceptions. They relate to impressions and if you add to that the flight of capital from Mexico and the invisible government process I think you have a very difficult problem in terms of getting American support and American political support for some of the things that we need to do.

I don't want to leave this subject on a negative and hopeless note. It seems to me that our presidents may have an unparalleled opportunity, perhaps the last opportunity. I recognize the normal phenomena where one country that is having economic problems does not want foreign aid from another country with strings attached. I submit that Mexico has something to sell to America. I think they have something to sell on a legitimate and respectable basis without in any way compromising either their principles or their national interest. What they have to sell is an insurance policy and I believe that the United States government might be in a position now where they would be willing to buy that insurance policy.

This policy relates to a change in the petrol chemical and resource policies in Mexico. I'm not talking so much of actually taking oil out of the ground and selling it to the United States nor about selling the natural gas that may exist in Baja California. I'm talking of a program where the Mexican government would sell the right to certain petroleum, petroleum products, and sources of natural gas to this country. If and when certain other situations developed in the world that would put the United States in a desperate position these rights would come into effect. It seems to be that in exchange for the sale of that insurance policy, Mexico could get substantial long term credits to work in the food area. Furthermore, the Mexican government and its people could obtain long term commitments and a relationship that would assist them to solve their fundamental social and economic problems without prejudicing their own political philosophies. I believe that such a relationship in the field of energy would not of itself impair Mexico's apparent desire to affiliate itself with the Third World. It seems to me that Mexico, by the kind of program I visualize, would be helping all of the underdeveloped nations in the world without natural resources because what I am talking about is giving the United States an option on another card in the international game of petroleum, a card that could be used to hold down the world price of energy. I think that time is critical not only for political and economic reasons. In my opinion there is not going to be a petroleum crisis for the rest of our lives. Sometime in the next few decades the ownership of considerable amounts of natural gas and oil in the ground is not going to be as valuable as it is right now. I think this is the time for Mexico to play her cards, for the United States and other nations of the Western world are not just going to go down the road continuing to burn up energy. No nation of the world that has any technical resources is going to allow its population, economy, and political system to be in the hands of a very small percentage of the population that happens to control substantial amounts of natural resources. So while we hear people talking about nothing happening in the energy crisis, something will happen, it always happens. Any nation that thinks they have a natural resource in their ground which is going to give them a tool forever has to understand that the natural resource has a finite value in the market place.

I think there are some other things that the presidents of both countries should do immediately. I think that the problems of Watergate have affected relationships between the United States and Mexico, but I think the policies within the Mexican business structure, government, administration, and public service have also affected them. I think that there is now a good opportunity for both presidents to dedicate themselves to a different form of relationship between government and business in their respective countries. I think that a great deal could be done to improve relations with the American business

community particularly if there were a clear cut understanding of what could and could not be done in Mexico. There is an understanding of what can be done through the normal visible government process. If business didn't also have to participate in the invisible government I think that this would have a major impact not only on the confidence of American investors in Mexico but of all investors in Mexico.

I also believe that the Mexican government must consider some form of limited currency control. I am being very presumptuous in dictating policy to a foreign country but I think that its unconscionable that people have been able to move billions of dollars out of the country at leisure. I suspect that our president of Mexico will have a finite period of time in which they will have the confidence of the electorate and the politicians, and I think that the time has come to study ways of reducing the capital flow out of Mexico.

Finally, I do not believe we should give up on the problems of immigration or at least with trying to solve those problems through some modified form of the Bracero program. I think that Doctor Bustamante's comments relating to food production were very good but I think, however, that those programs should be considered to be joint ventures between private business and the United States with government support of market displacement, if necessary, in order that they be politically acceptable. I would like to point out that one of the most successful marketing programs in food that I know of is a program run by the Mexican government here in San Diego. They own and operate a private business, a California business. I believe the Mexican government is today the largest distributor of fish products in the world. I think the same thing could be done in the field of agriculture. But I also think that we, in terms of the undocumented immigration problem, should recognize that while we might be able to make major social changes in the work force, there is again an opportunity for Mexico to make something available to the United States, something that is valuable and needed. I think we can both be more imaginative in developing forms of the Bracero program and at the same time be looking at alternatives in food production programs.

In conclusion I would like to say that in my opinion there is no problem of greater importance than the relationships between Mexico and the United States. If those relationships aren't on a sound basis the relationships between Southern California and Baja California cannot be on a sound basis. The problems of these relationships won't be solved unless we are prepared to face some of the political realities connected with them. I disagree with the concept that we cannot discuss or try to solve problems that would require tough political decisions. If the Presidents of the United States and Mexico cannot develop support within their political constituencies and within the general public for the basic changes that are needed in the structure of government in both countries, then all the other things we've talked about will be just cosmetic or too late.

Las percepciones del público americano con relación a México parecen básicas para resolver los problemas entre los dos países. Los pronósticos indican que en los próximos veinte años el único grupo mayoritario de población en California será el de aquellas personas con apellido mexicano o español. Es tiempo de que seamos francos.

Derribando los problemas inherentes a la relación EE. UU. – México nos quedan los siguientes elementos:

1. El proceso invisible del gobierno en México que crea dificultades para los inversionistas extranjeros y las comunidades de negocios.

2. La fuga de capitales de México, lo cual deteriora la estructura económica del país.

3. Una penetrante falta de confianza en México, la cual complica más aun el problema del equilibrio de pagos y la decadencia del turismo. Esta confianza es esencial para el sostenimiento popular y político americanos que se necesita para obtener la solución de los problemas.

4. El problema de inmigración, que conceptiblemente, pudiera ser mitigado por medio de una forma modificada del programa de braceros. Los americanos ven que México tiene algo que vender–y eso es energía. El gobierno mexicano podría vender a los EE. UU. el derecho a ciertos productos petrolíferos y a ciertos recursos de gas natural, derechos que no serían disfrutados hasta y cuando los EE. UU. se vieran en una posición desesperada por el desarrollo de las situaciones mundiales. En cambio por esta seguridad de energía, México recibiría créditos a largo plazo para trabajar en áreas de interés para ellos, tales como alimento. Dada esta opción, los EE. UU. podrían ayudar a detener el precio mundial de energía a bajo nivel auxiliando con eso a todos los países subdesarrollados que carecen de recursos naturales. Sin embargo, el tiempo es decisivo ya que estos recursos no serán valiosos indefinidamente, se procuran constantemeate otras fuentes de energía.

Los problemas que estamos discutiendo están rodeados de realidades políticas. Si los presidentes de EE. UU. y México pudieran desarrollar apoyo dentro de sus constituciones para los cambios que se necesitan hacer en la estructura gubernamental de ambos países, entonces sería posible hallar las soluciones a estos problemas.

A CONVERSATION ON "TEMPORARY PARADISE?" PART I

by Kevin Lynch, urban planner and Professor of Urban Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and co-author of "Temporary Paradise?"

Two years ago we were asked to make a study of the landscape of San Diego to analyze its quality and what was happening to it, and to recommend what the city might do. I fell in love with that landscape, as most people do, Mediterranean climate, the mountains, the sea and the rivers. But I still remember our first helicopter ride over the city. I saw the borderline cut straight across the valley, just like a knife cut, and the tremendous contrast of settlement on both sides. That sticks in my mind as the most special aspect of this region. It isn't the San Diego region, it is San Diego/Tijuana, a very special mix on a special piece of terrain.

Let me sketch this region for you. You come down the coast from a metropolitan area that shall be nameless. Along the coast there are lagoons and then La Jolla, the first outcrop. Then Mission Bay, with its islands which is a wonderful piece of artificial landscape. Point Loma is the second outcrop. Then San Diego Bay and Coronado. Next the lagoon at the base of the Tijuana River and then the coast continues. Behind that run the mountains, the backbone of the region. Those mountains begin to close in not far below San Diego Bay. The Tijuana River marks the last opening. Between those mountains and the water are mesas, cut by all the streams that flow to the ocean: the Penasquitos, the San Dieguito, the San Diego itself, struggling through the remains of Mission Valley, the poor old Sweetwater, almost gone. The Otay River here, and then finally the Tijuana. In between those is the high ground dissected by arroyos. The last major plateau is the Mesa de Otay down there. This whole space between the mountains and the sea is really one room. It has special climate and the water cycles across it. Everything here is interrelated. But across the very bottom of that room is drawn an arbitrary line. It cuts the Tijuana River in three different places, cuts the Mesa de Otay in half and divides the outlet of the Tijuana River from the rest.

It is as though I were to take this room and make a diagonal division. I'll start with Fernando and his coat lapels and draw my diagonal across to that wall. Then I would ask one third of the audience if they would please move over and drape themselves on the walls or sit on the floor. The border divided the last part of the flat buildable land off from the rest of the region. With so little space for growth, the Mexican planners and engineers face great difficulties. San Diego is a linear city, going down along the bay, and there are scattered communities up the north coast. Tijuana, however, whose population is a third of the region is crammed into a closet; up the Tijuana River as far as the dam,

where the mountains close in, a little bit down the coast, and now spreading over the rough ground to the south, a very difficult terrain.

Building with small resources on crowded land, across a natural drainage basin cut in half, all difficulties are compounded. Water is crucial in any settlement, but the principal river is practically dry because most of the water is drawn off on the North American side. Yet Tijuana is clearly part of one physiographic region, part of one economic region, part of one metropolitan area.

Despite that unity, you find that most people have a peculiar and distorted picture of their habitat. Look at those maps on display on the wall alongside you. The first one is North America. The Mexican territory is blank, except for a tiny little worm called Tijuana that somebody added as an afterthought. Then there is a map from the Mexican side in which the United States territory is blank. This is repeated again and again on official maps. Only one of those drawings shows the metropolitan region as a whole and you only have to look at it to see what the astonishing diversity of use as one crosses the line. We did some studies of how San Diego people imagine the region. Among other things, we asked them to draw maps of the region. Some of those are given in our report. Again and again you find that they draw their own locality, the beaches that they use, and then there is a vague connection down south somewhere and that's Mexico. There is the Avenida Revolucion perhaps, but nothing more. Few realize that Tijuana is a large urban area, growing at a tremendous rate and not focused at all on the Avenida Revolucion. It is an industrial city and may be growing faster than any other city in the world today.

The planning office of the city of San Diego at this moment is working on a growth management plan. How to manage growth so that you don't destroy the region is perhaps the key problem for the city. And yet that growth management plan takes no account of the fact that the most staggering growth in the region is occurring south of the border. There is no contact, as far as I can tell, with the Mexican authorities.

The Comprehensive Planning Organization, which is supposed to look at the whole region, is doing, as far as I know, a technically competent job of making a population projection—deciding not only what is likely to happen, but what the region wants to become and how that population should be distributed. As far as I know there is no connection between those studies and the tremendous population growth that is occurring on the other side. How can you study the development of a metropolitan area without looking at the thing as a whole? Particularly when the most rapid growth and the worst problems are on the other side.

The problems of the San Diego/Tijuana region are joint problems. Fernando has mentioned some of them. Water is certainly one of your most critical issues. Water is precious. Our lives depend on it, as well as agriculture and our food supply. Industry depends on it. Only 60 percent of the houses in Tijuana have water; 40 percent do not. The water they have is not on all the time. The Tijuana River itself is bone dry except for the occasional flood. They are bringing an aqueduct over from Mexicali which is supplied by the Colorado, but the water already is heavily tapped on the North American side. There is a long history of development and treaty arrangements which has brought about an intricate redistribution of the natural flow of water and which, in the end, leaves the Mexican side highly disadvantaged. To look at the

unpaved roads and the dust and the water trucks that are operating in Tijuana and then to see the extensive watered lawns and greenery on this side is at least visually shocking if nothing else.

Sewage as well. The engineers in Tijuana are going a heroic job of building a waste disposal system under tremendous difficulties. Something like half the houses are now connected to sewers in Tijuana. Their main trunk, of course, comes down the Tijuana Valley which is the natural gradient but when it hits the border—the indivisible wall—the sewage has to be pumped back uphill again. Pumped to the west, across the hills and backward south to an outfall to the ocean. Of course nature takes care of the thing anyway, the ocean currents flow north at that point and that sewage flows back north once more. But it is a long way around.

The Mexican authorities are planning to close that sewer outfall. They realize that you can't have raw sewage flowing in such quantities into the ocean. It is polluting their beaches as well as ours. They plan a sewage treatment plant up on the Mesa de Otay but that also will require pumping. The sewage will be pumped up to the treatment plant, and the treated water will be reused for agriculture. Tijuana also connects to an overload line that runs, by agreement, into U.S. territory in the lower valley. That overload line, which is supposedly only for emergencies, is used almost every day. Most probably, treatment plants will have to built on the U.S. side to take care of that emergency flow from Mexico.

The insanity of taking care of human wastes by using water, which is such a precious substance, to carry them is another story. We have been trapped by historical accident, by the history of growing cities in humid Europe, where recurrent problems were met piecemeal. Thus we developed the whole primitive technology of sewering. It is probably just the wrong way of taking care of human waste but it is the system we have. It consumes great volumes of water, and consumes it at a tremendous cost.

Professor Wilson and his students have done the first studies of the flow of air pollution in this basin that I have seen. Los Angeles' dirty air drifts down to San Diego, and San Diego's goes to Tijuana. Everyone is generous.

Although they are building some few new playgrounds in Tijuana there are, that I know of, no parks in the city at all, for a population of 600 or 700 thousand people, except for the old tiny Central Plaza and a golf course that's open to the wealthy. The open space is just across the border.

There are problems of transportation, the border control gates, the question of joint transit or express buses, the issue of the airport. The last has presumably been laid to rest for the moment, but it will come back. Lindbergh field, I think, will become untenable sooner or later. One of the possible future airport sites is close to the border, or possibly even on the border. I am not aware of any joint planning being done to see whether that is really feasible, whether the flight approaches can be kept open, or what the effect will be on the Mexican side.

There are questions of connections to the East. I have just learned that the railroad to Arizona, a branch of the Santa Fe, part of whose course winds through Mexico, has been washed out by the hurricane and damaged so severely that it is unlikely to be replaced. If so, that has very serious consequences for hopes of connecting this region with agricultural lands to the east. Tijuana is

crowded in a narrow valley, and its houses are spilling into the canyons where they are subject to flood. They are on steep slopes where there are problems of access and of holding the land against erosion. Probably their last easily usable space is the Mesa de Otay. The two principal physical problems are the questions of water and land.

The physical problems of planning may not be the key ones. They are more likely to be the issues of economic development, and also those deeper ones of cultural adjustment. But I think the physical environment has an important role to play, because it presents concrete questions which are relatively easy to grasp, and around which it is possible to get joint action. One of the ways in which you can use joint physical planning is as a way forward toward much more general cooperation. A first step may be to try to mount some joint studies of the ecology, of water supply, of the air movements, and of the perception of the environment, something which I'm particularly interested in. Analyzing perceptions on both sides of the border might be one very important way of coming together.

I've heard people say that the Mexican migrants coming into the area are not much concerned about the land and the landscape, that they are too desperate for a job. I don't know, of course, I haven't talked to them, but I doubt it. The studies we've done elsewhere, in the low income housing areas of Mexico City and also with adolescents in one of the squatter settlements on the very edge of Mexico City, make it clear that these people, while economically desperate, are very much concerned about the quality of the environment. The dust and the smoke, the smog, the lack of plants and vegetation, is important to them. They have a strong feeling for the land. Without knowing more, my guess is that you'd find the same attitudes in Tijuana. If you can find a common ground in the love of the land, and the need to protect it, you may then be building a bridge across the border just like the possible bridges of language and culture.

One of the best ways of avoiding misunderstandings is to work together. I do sense this lack of understanding here. For example, when I go to the San Diego Library to learn about Tijuana, I find about fifteen titles, most of them about bullfights, and what you buy in the Avenida Revolucion, plus a few typescript articles by one man, and some reminiscence of the 1911 invasion. Most of this is in the locked California room. When I went to Tijuana yesterday I saw some young girls marching with batons. I asked what for, and they said they were practicing for November twentieth, the day of the Revolution. It suddenly occurred to me that November twentieth is this day of conference. It seems puzzling to me that no one mentions it. If such a meeting on joint cooperation were held on the Fourth of July in Mexico and there were North Americans in the audience, we'd be puzzled that nobody mentioned the fact. The maps are blank, people just don't see each other. Getting people to work together which is always a long process and a painful one, is to get them to see together. Therefore, while I feel that there ought to be more professional studies of, the water system, the ecology, and so on, it is more important for people on both sides of the border to begin to study their common land and their common landscape. You could use television for example, but not as we did last night when a few scholars made a talk. For instance, the cameras might go to a community in Tijuana to show what it is like to live there, talking with the people, seeing what their daily round is like. Do the same thing on the

other side in what I will guess to many Tijuana people seems to be the cold and closed U.S. suburb, and they in turn might see that there are real people there who have their own warmth and their own way of living. The physical environment is an especially felicitous means of increasing understanding and helping people to learn together, because the land is real and you have a common love for it.

El orador discute primero la geografía del área de San Diego y Tijuana–la línea fronteriza más o menos trazada arbitrariamente (inexistencia de fronteras naturales), la configuración y desarrollo costeros, y los ríos compartidos. Las dificultades que la mayor parte de las ciudades afrontan se mezclan en Tijuana. Está construyendo con pocos recursos en una tierra atestada de gente donde el lecho de desagüe se corta en mitad. Un aspecto decisivo del desarrollo es el agua y la mayor parte del agua es detenida y usada en los EE. UU. de modo que el principal río de Tijuana casi está seco.

La región está entera, muy natural y los problemas de hechura humana en el área son los problemas de ambos lados de la frontera, no obstante en los mapas originados de cada lado, el opuesto se encuentra impresionantemente en blanco.

Tanto la Oficina de Planificación de la Ciudad de San Diego como la Organización de Planificación Comprensiva están estudiando el crecimiento regional y la administración de la tierra pero ninguna se interesa suficientemente en el área al sur de la frontera. No se comprende en qué manera puede un área metropolitana estudiar sus problemas excluyendo parte de su área, especialmente cuando los problemas más profundos existen y el mayor crecimiento es evidente en al área excluída. La mayor parte de los problemas de la región son problemas comunes: 1) agua; 2) drenaje; 3) contaminación ambiental; 4) zonas verdes; 5) aeropuerto; 6) cultivo de alimentos; 7) espacio para construcciones. Los problemas claves no son problemas físicos o de planificación sino aquéllos de desarrollo económico y los más penetrantes de ajuste cultural. Pueda que haya un terreno común entre las gentes de ambas ciudades en cuanto a su amor por la tierra. La gente de ambos lados necesita estudiar su tierra común y su paisaje común y descubrir por ellos mismos que también pueden compartir un amor común por ellos.

A CONVERSATION ON "TEMPORARY PARADISE?" PART II

by Fernando Sepúlveda Amor, Director of Planning for the Undersecretariat for Environmental Improvement, Department of Health and Welfare, Mexico

We, like those living in the San Diego-Tijuana area, are interested in a common way of living and interested in preserving this wonderful region. Being practical, however, we must admit that if, at the national level, improving conditions is in some ways difficult, at the international level it is even harder. You have to first of all have a coherent comprehensive view of what you want and that of all the agencies involved in the planning and building processes in urban areas. It also demands a great effort for and need for coordination. I must say, unfortunately, that this has not always been the case but that we now have a great opportunity to talk among ourselves to see what we want of this region and of the future for the border towns of Mexicali, Tecate, and Tijuana.

I am first of all interested in something that appears immediately when you visit the region and are studying the problems of the area. That is the conservation of nature. The environment, especially the one down in the Peninsula, is a very, very fragile one. It can be disturbed very easily and it was protected before because almost no one went there. Now the improvement of communications, the increasing population, and the pressure of development makes it more and more difficult to preserve land, water, and environment in this area. This is a problem that has come rather quickly in the last thirty years because of the population growth of the area. Tijuana, fifty years ago, was a very small town. San Diego was only connected to the Santa Fe Railroad in the beginning of the century. Before this the whole region was rather isolated. There were no great problems and no conflict between people and the environment. Now we see changes every year. If you see aerial photographs of the region from 1950 to 1960 and to the present, you see that everything has changed a lot in a very quick way. This pressure, of which we are sometimes unaware, has suddenly become a crisis. The problem is greater than it should be, the solution for it now takes more money and, in some cases, damage is irreversible.

When I hear people talk about San Diego they often refer to the "city" of San Diego but they are thinking of the metropolitan area. Many of you, I am sure, think of San Diego as a very large, urbanized area that in the north reaches as far as perhaps Los Angeles, to the East of El Cajon and further, and to Tijuana in the south. Many of you also understand that there are different ways of developing this area from the Mexican point of view and from the United States' point of view.

Personally, I don't think that in general the way cities are growing right now is the best way to grow. First because of our attitude. If the future world

will be urban we cannot extrapolate the way we lived in small towns to large and urbanized areas. This has to be a starting point of looking at the way we should live in the future. It is, perhaps, not the way we have lived in past centuries. Even if we don't make dramatic changes in the patterns of living, however, we can understand that something is wrong in the cities the way they are now and that we have to change it. We have old towns, the central part of towns, decaying in many cities. We have large suburban areas with a lot of communications, individual communications, with cars that means highways. The street has been losing the sense it had before and the automobile is changing the perspective of the city so that we are not living anymore in the city, but are inhabiting a home we drive to in the car. We don't feel the city. We go down to our office, we stay there eight hours and we come out. This leads to a lot of tension and to a lot of misunderstanding of the environment, and of our relations with nature and with other people. Personally I think this has to change and we need to explore what is the best way for this to change.

Speaking from the area that I know best, Tijuana is, as we have said, a very fast growing city and has been oriented basically to services and to tourism. I feel that the inside of Tijuana, the old view of Tijuana is going to change very rapidly in the next years. First because Tijuana developed very rapidly from 1950 on, perhaps to 1965 or 1970, and everything was provisional. I feel that many of the people that came to Tijuana really didn't intend to stay. They wanted to go to the United States but for some reason they established themselves in Tijuana with not many resouces for making a living; that's why you see areas covered with houses made of impermanent materials like wood, cardboard, and tin.

Another thing that will change in the way Tijuana will grow is that the land is now secure. I don't know if you know that until 1973, or perhaps 1972, the city of Tijuana was challenged and the property was supposed to belong to a company. They were in court demanding the city of Tijuana and the ownership of the whole town. That caused great problems. Instead of buying land squatters settled anwhere and their social and economical conditions made the shape of Tijuana. The city developed in the hills with no services, no paved roads, with no planned distribution but now the land problem has been solved and the real estate department of the Government of Baja California is developing land with elementary services so that people have some place to go even if they are of a very low income.

Third, I think that the construction of the channel of the Tijuana river allowed us to recover a lot of very good flat land that before was very dangerous to develop because of floods. The structure built there will make the new downtown of Tijuana and will give it a new shape. There is a lot of money in Tijuana. There is a lot of economic movement and now that technology is more advanced building is of a higher quality. All the investments that before were not secure in buildings will go now to this part of old Tijuana and they will build a new downtown. I feel also that the external shape will be very different from that of the San Diego region. Because of the problems of land, Tijuana will have to be a more compact city, perhaps with buildings of high level and the density of population will be also higher. So we will see a very well delineated frontier between a very compact city and a very spread out city in the border.

We do have a problem with water supply. You cannot think of a city growing indefinitely over the years if you don't think that it can be supplied with the basic resources for living. You might not have water for industry or for activities with a high use of water, but you need water for living. Even under the best conditions, economic conditions, people will still be coming to the border towns to stay but we know that we cannot indefinitely absorb people because we have a lack of usable land for urban development and a lack of water.

I feel that some of the problems that are now present in smaller scale in Tijuana are going to be present in the San Diego region in a different way. First of all, because I feel that the cost of services is going to increase very sharply in the next few years and if there are problems with energy, with the economy, it doesn't seem feasible for San Diego to continue growing the way it has been. On the other hand you cannot stop growth just like that. It responds to a very complicated mechanism that involved economics, social, and even climatic conditions. I feel, however, that if we are to preserve this area as the beautiful, habitable place it is now, this problem of growth is one with which we should begin.

I'm sure the population growth in both Tijuana and San Diego won't stop, but what we can do as urban planners is direct it with the involvement of the people. First of all we need to find out what we want of our cities. When we have a very definite thought or conception of what the characteristics of a new city or a new way of living are, the urban planners should come and try to interpret this thought. The urban future of the world should not be that everything is urbanized with no land or environment left.

El ambiente de la región de California Sur y Baja California es extremadamente frágil. Con el creciente aumento en el área el problema de protección ambiental se cierne extensamente y en algunos casos el daño ya es irreparable.

Para determinar nuestro destino, debemos empezar a hacernos preguntas muy básicas concernientes a qué tipo de ciudad queremos y cómo queremos vivir en el futuro en lugar de permitir simplemente el crecimiento citadino. Debemos considerar todos los factores– preservación ambiental, condiciones climatológicas (tales como una mínima precipitación pluvial anual), necesidades económicas, sociales y de energía. Luego, basados en estos requisitos y valores, debiéramos formular un concepto definido acerca del tipo de ciudad que quisiéramos ver desarrollarse. Con este concepto en mente podríamos entonces dirigirnos a los urbanistas para la ejecución de nuestras ideas. De este modo podríamos construir ciudades que llenaran nuestras necesidades en tanto que conservarían un ambiente habitable, y quizá aun hermoso.

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
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